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 NOTES FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK  
Dear Reader,  
 
Welcome to Issue 9 of the Asian Journal of 
Public Affairs. Due to unforeseen 
circumstances, we have only published one 
issue for this academic year, but we assure 
you that we have maintained the same 
integrity in publishing as we have had in 
the past. We thank our readers for their 
continued support and patience.  
 
The theme of our commentary is the 
impact of social media, and we are 
honoured to have pieces written by 
frontrunners in their field. Our first 
commentary comes from Ms. Maria Ressa 
analysing the growing influence of social 
media in today’s politics. Followed by Dr. 
Robert Klitgaard who discusses how social 
media in India has found a path from 
complaints to solutions.  Our last 
commentary is by Dr Ong Kian Ming who 
illustrates the importance of social media 
within Southeast Asia.  
 
We further the discussion on the impact of 
media with our first article, Role of the 
Media in Uncovering the Political Corruption 
in South Asian Perspective, which discusses 
extensively the role of media and how it 
influences corruption in South Asia. 
  
Rethinking the Philippine Development, 
emphasizes that the Filipino institutional 
and behavioural contexts need to be taken 
in to account in order to apply core public 
policy and economic principles for 
development.  
 
Next, we have two articles from China 
focusing on the role of law and its use in 
politics and governance. In A Battle for 
Values: Hong Kong and Its Constitutions, the 
author discusses the role of Basic Law in 
the debates regarding democracy in Hong 
Kong, a Special Administrative Region of 
China.  Our article Reforming China’s Water 
Law through Reforms of the Division of 
Administrative Functions and Delegate Powers 
proposes necessary reforms in water laws 
in order for water governance to be 
improved within China.  
 
To round out our articles, we present a 
piece entitled  The State of the American 
Public Administration Field which provides 
policymakers in Asia insight and 
important lessons to be learned from the 
American public administration process.  
 
Finally, our book review of Amitav 
Acharya’s Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and 
Power in Asian Regionalism, analyses 
Acaharya’s take on regionalism in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
Our sincerest thanks to the contributing 
commentators and authors whose timely 
responses have made this issue possible. 
Lastly, we would like to thank our 
advisors, Associate Professor Darryl Jarvis 
and Dr Suzaina Kadir for their support, Ms 
Andrea Liew for her administrative help, 
and former editor, Mr Arley Smude for his 
graphic design assistance.   
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
AJPA Editorial Board  
April 2012 
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RAPPLER: REDEFINING JOURNALISM  
IN A SOCIAL WORLD 
 
 
Maria Ressa1 
Since I rolled out social media for the Philippines’ largest television news group 
in 2007, I had long been toying with the idea that technology and social media 
can significantly alter real world outcomes.  I had early successes, partly because 
our campaigns were created for a country which was dubbed the texting capital 
of the world and, in 2010,  named by ComScore as the social media capital of the 
world. 
 In a 2007 campaign we called “Boto Mo, Ipatrol Mo” – which roughly translates 
to Patrol Your Vote, we took the traditional power of broadcast media and 
combined it with new media – the Internet, mobile phone technology and social 
media – to create the first instance globally where a news media organization 
called on citizens to create user-generated content for a very active, political 
purpose – to patrol their votes and push for clean elections.  
 We moved one step ahead of western media organizations because of our unique 
political situation: a country of 88 million people in a democracy which still used 
manual voting and counting … where charges of fraud, cheating and violence in 
elections are constant and consistent.  
 No candidate ever admits losing in Philippine elections.  They just say they were 
cheated!  And as far as violence – well, in 2007, the Philippine National Police 
said it was one of our most peaceful elections ever – with nearly 130 people killed 
in 217 poll-related incidents of violence! 
 The results: anecdotal evidence that cellphones in the hands of ordinary people 
acted as a form of deterrence, preventing officials from using government 
                                                        
1
 Maria A. Ressa is the CEO and Executive Editor of Rappler, a social news network which uses a hearts 
and minds approach to news through a unique mood navigator.  Created for the web’s participatory nature, 
Rappler combines the best of professional journalism with citizen journalism and crowdsourcing. Her 
upcoming book, From Bin Laden to Facebook, is part of her work as the Author-in-Residence and Senior 
Fellow at the International Centre for Political Terrorism Research in Singapore. 
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resources for their campaigns and committing other illegal acts of electioneering 
as well as helping expose election violence to a nationwide audience.  
 In the weeks leading up to elections, we received 500 messages a week and on 
election day, we received a message a minute.  This is crowdsourcing for a 
political purpose.  In the process, it breathed new life into idealism and 
supported individual battles of integrity in far-flung areas of a nation of 7,100 
islands.  Working together, professional journalists and citizen journalists could 
shine a national spotlight to local instances of corruption or violence. 
 While that was successful, I could already see the next iteration in our call for 
user-generated content.  In 2007, two Harvard professors, Nicholas Christakis 
and James Fowler, began publishing a series of studies using available data from 
the Heart Study in Framingham, Massachusetts.  By using new data visualization 
and mapping techniques, these social scientists concluded that social networks 
magnify what they’re seeded with, spreading emotions and behaviour like 
happiness2, loneliness3, political views & voting behaviour4,sexual behaviour & 
disease contagion5 smoking and even obesity6   
 They formulated the Three Degrees of Influence Rule, which states that emotions 
and behaviour spread through three degrees. For example, if I’m feeling lonely, 
my friend has a 52% chance of feeling lonely.  My friend’s friend (two degrees) 
has a 25% chance of feeling lonely because I do, and my friend’s friend’s friend 
(three degrees) has a 15% chance of feeling lonely.  
 I was fascinated with finding practical applications for this idea. Focus-group 
discussions showed us that the Filipino youth were dissatisfied and disillusioned 
with our country’s political processes.  So we decided to spread hope.  We crafted 
a campaign that would show, not tell, and use action, not words.  
                                                        
2
 J.H.Fowler & N.A. Christakis, “Dynamic Spread of Happiness in  Large Social Network: 
Longitudinal Analysis Over 20 Years in the Framingham Heart Study,” British Medical Journal 
337 (2008) 
3
 J.T. Cacioppo, J.H. Fowler & N.A. Christakis, “Alone in the Crowd: The Structure and Spread of 
Loneliness in a Large Social Network,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 97 (2009). 
4
 J.H. Fowler, M.T. Heaney, D.W. Nickerson, J.F. Padgett & B. Sinclair, “Causality in Political   
Networks,” American Politics Research, 39:437 (2011). 
5
 P.S. Bearman, J. Moody & K. Stovel, “Chains of Affection,” American Journal of Psychology, 110 
(2004) and J.J. Potterat and others, “Sexual Network Structure as an Indicator of Epidemic 
Phase,Sexually Transmitted Infections, 78 (2002). 
6
 N.A. Christakis & J.H. Fowler, “The Spread of Obesity in  Large Social Network Over 32 
Years,” The New England Journal of Medicine, 375 (2007). 
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 We added a simple tagline to our original campaign.  In 2009, it became “Boto 
Mo, iPatrol Mo: Ako ang Simula.”  “Ako ang Simula” – literally translated means 
“I am the beginning.”  In spirit, it means “Change Begins with Me.”  We didn’t 
want to reinvent the wheel so we drew from universal messages.  This was 
inspired by Mahatma Gandhi’s “Be the Change You Want to See.”  
 We decided to spread hope through empowerment, and we seeded every single 
communication point with that message.  It was a call to action7 
 The results magnified our 2007 campaign 7 to 8 times and again showed me how 
a mass media campaign combined with technology and social media can inspire 
action and user-generated content for a tactical, political purpose. 
 From 2009-2010, we monitored the impact of our experiments in media for social 
change.  Our research arm conducted monthly focus-group discussions which 
allowed me to tweak the campaign’s progress and choose which platform was 
appropriate for each message.  
 We also participated in nationwide surveys, culminating in a final nationwide 
report conducted by the country’s most credible polling institution, Pulse Asia.  
Its July 2010 survey showed the full impact of our AKO ANG SIMULA 
campaign.  It said Filipinos reached the highest level of optimism nationwide 
since the Pulse Asia surveys began in 1999, with 53% optimistic and only 11% 
pessimistic (the lowest the group has recorded).  It also showed a boost to our 
network’s credibility ratings. 
 A lot more was happening in 2009, which was a banner year for social media.  
That was when it hit a global tipping point.  The numbers tell the story: if 
Facebook was a country, it would be the third largest in the world.  There were 
30,000 hours of videos uploaded every minute on YouTube, reaching a billion 
views per day.  More than 1.5 million pieces of content were shared daily; 25 
billion every month, and this is my personal favourite which said it all.  In 2009, 
social media overtook porn as the number 1 activity on the Internet. 
 In 2011, as Author-in-Residence and Senior Fellow at the International Centre for 
Political Violence & Terrorism Research at RSIS, I began to seriously study how 
technology was changing the people using it and, more specifically, I began to 
use the same studies I used for communication campaigns to look at how 
terrorism, which is a volatile cocktail of emotions, can spread through social 
                                                        
7
Video call to action available here  
http://www.youtube.com/user/bravenewworldressa?blend=22&ob=5#p/u/0/D13Q23BXpZg 
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networks.  Those findings will be published in an upcoming book, FROM BIN 
LADEN TO FACEBOOK: HOW TERRORISM SPREADS. 
 News events in 2011 validated ideas I was playing with: the Arab spring, the 
London riots and Occupy Wall Street showed how quickly social media can 
amplify and spread emotions virally across societies.  As you can see, these news 
events have both positive and negative consequences.  In the London riots, for 
example, looters planned attacks on social media just as the clean-up was also 
planned on social media.  This more than any event shows us how social media is 
a tool that can be used for good or evil. 
 The medium that carries the message shapes and defines the message itself.  
Social media’s instantaneous nature pushed the speed at which these revolutions 
unravelled and spread discontent virally across borders.  The first messages 
created ripple effects, amplified and pushed further by countless, nameless others 
spreading not just the message itself but their emotions – what psychologists call 
emotional contagion, modelled on the networks of the web – loose, non-
hierarchical, leaderless.    
 These are the ideas and experiences that went into the creation of Rappler, a 
social news network (http://www.rappler.com).  Rappler comes from the root 
words “rap” (to talk) + “ripple” (to make waves).  A new company set up this 
year, we are composed of veteran award-winning, investigative journalists 
working with digital natives, artists, NGO, IT & television professionals.  Rappler 
wants to harness new technology, analyse how it’s changing us as people and 
attempt to use it for social good.  In the process, we redefine journalism, build 
communities, and crowd-source actions for specific purposes. 
 We wanted to create a pilot, scalable model for countries like the Philippines, 
where institutions and governance remain weak, leading to a lack of 
accountability.  They need to be societies where internet and mobile penetration 
rates are high enough to create an alternative distribution platform that could 
empower the bottom of the pyramid, and there must be high adoption rates to 
new technology and social media. 
 Rappler lies at the centre of three overlapping circles: professional journalism, 
technology and crowdsourcing or what James Surowiecki called, ‘the wisdom of 
crowds’ – when large groups of people take small steps to create something 
specific and unique.  Rappler gives rich media stories (true multimedia drawing 
on our broadcasting, print and television backgrounds) with a blend of expert 
opinion and the wisdom of crowds. 
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 At its centre is the world’s only hearts-and-minds approach to news.  Every story 
has a unique mood meter.  Neuroscientists say the very act of defining how you 
feel can make you more prone to listen to reason.  So after watching or reading a 
story, you can click how you feel.  After clicking on your mood, you’re then 
prompted to write why you feel that way and to share both the story and your 
comments on your social networks. 
 While you’re doing that, the data from every mood meter is aggregated onto the 
site’s mood navigator – which exhibits a crowd-sourced mood of the day.  That’s 
only the first crowdsourcing Rappler does.  In the coming days, expect to see 
aggregation and visualization of data that help show why specific crowd-sourced 
actions are necessary. 
 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies (FMRI) – brain scans – of people 
on Facebook and Twitter show that social media is literally rewiring our brains 
and agitating our emotions.  These studies show elevated levels of dopamine, a 
chemical that causes mild addiction, as well as oxytocin, the “love hormone.”  If 
you hug someone longer than 6 seconds, your body begins to produce oxytocin.  
It’s behind the need to connect, 3rd in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.  These are 
only some of the biological reasons why social media is addictive. 
 One more key idea is behind Rappler’s mood meter: the findings that 80% of the 
way people make decisions is not because of rational thought but because of their 
emotions. 
 When you put these ideas together, you begin to see a fundamental shift in the 
way we consume media and how technology is heightening our emotions.  By 
anchoring emotions on stories, Rappler stimulates community engagement and 
creates specific crowd-sourced actions which can spread faster through social 
media. 
 Understanding social media begins with understanding technology and its real 
world impact on people and social networks.  If we start there, then it’s easier to 
see potential applications for the future, one where journalism creates a 
participatory culture and taps collective intelligence for nation-building. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
8 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS VOL. 5. NO. 1 
SOCIAL MEDIA: A NEW TACTIC   
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 
 
Dr. Robert Klitgaard1 
 
You have to admit, it’s a snappy title:  Ipaidabribe.com.   
 
If you’re in India, you can go to Ipaidabribe using SMS or Twitter or Facebook 
and report corrupt acts.  How much did you have to pay for that permit or 
license, or to get out of that traffic ticket?  Your reports and many others become 
the source of unprecedented data about bribery.   
 
And a source of unprecedented outrage.  Over the past year and a half, 
Ipaidabribe.com helped galvanize a movement against corruption never before 
seen in India (http://ipaidabribe.com). 
The People against Corruption 
 
Ipaidabribe helps civil society live up to its anti-corruption potential.  Civil 
society—a.k.a. the people—have distinctive competencies in the fight against 
street-level corruption.  One is knowledge.  Collectively, the people know where 
corruption occurs with police and service-providers, permit-givers and tax-
collectors, and in many local construction projects.   
 
How can we glean this knowledge from citizens about corruption?  They need to 
be able to report their experiences easily and anonymously.  They need to see 
results, if only that their reports are not being ignored. 
 
When governments ask citizens to report corruption, the results are often 
disappointing.  Often the process is not easy.  Citizens may not believe promises 
of anonymity and may fear reprisals.  And when they do file a report, often 
nothing ensues.  Cynicism is reinforced.  Why bother? 
 
Suppose instead citizens report to each other.  Suppose we have a website where 
we can describe our experiences with corruption easily and anonymously by SMS 
                                                        
1
Robert Klitgaard is a University Professor at Claremont Graduate University in the United States.  In 
parts of the summers of 2010 and 2011, he visited the LKY School as the Li Ka Shing Visiting Professor.  In 
2012, he and Professor Scott Fritzen used live videostreaming to co-teach a course at both CGU and the 
LKY School on public sector reform in developing countries. 
 
  
 
 
 
  9 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS VOL. 5. NO. 1 
or Twitter or Facebook.  Suppose we can subsequently see the patterns of bribery 
in our town or region, in this-or-that ministry.  Suppose the website also enables 
us we to share the ways that we have managed to avoid paying bribes—how 
we’ve beaten corruption in our daily lives.   
 
Suppose, in a word, we have ipaidabribe.com.   
Social Media 
 
This pioneering Indian website went online in September 2010 by Swati and 
Ramesh Ramanathan, along with Sridar Iyengar, of the Janaagraha Centre for 
Citizenship and Democracy, a civil-society organization in Bangalore.  “Please do 
NOT report names,” the website says.  “We aim to change processes not target 
individuals.”  Ipaidabribe takes individual reports and produces tables and maps 
showing where corruption is happening and how much various transactions cost.  
You can read people’s short reports and examine the resulting data.  In another 
part of the website, people also help each other figure out how to avoid bribes.  
  
In the last year and a half, this idea has gone viral.  At least 20 countries have 
something similar, such as ipaidbribe in Pakistan and ipaidabribe in Kenya.  In 
Estonia, the smartphone app Bribespot lets users reveal and then visualize the 
corruption that surrounds them.  The app determines the user’s location and then 
displays reported instances of bribery nearby.  The app’s “bribe stream” reveals 
specifics about each bribe, including the amount and how it was requested or 
paid (http://bribespot.com/).  
 
In Latin America, similar ideas are being tested regarding crime instead of 
corruption (http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=3887).  Latin America is also 
using social media to fight electoral corruption.  In Argentina, the civil-society 
organization Citizens’ Power enables citizens to share information about 
campaign financing for different candidates (http://poderciudadano.org/quien-te-
banca/). A similar effort has worked in Colombia 
(http://www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/HERRAMIENTAS/AplicativoCuentas
Claras/tabid/87/Default.aspx).  In Guatemala, citizens use social media to report 
irregularities in the electoral process 
(http://www.miradorelectoralguatemala.org/ushahidi-new/).   
What Impacts? 
 
Evaluation lags innovation.  It is not yet known what impacts these initiatives 
have had.  Indeed, a recent conference debated what the measures of success 
should be (hits on a website? number of bribes reported? changes in measures of 
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government efficiency? http://europeandcis.undp.org/blog/2011/11/25/social-
media-for-anticorruption-from-“why”-to-“how-to”/).  Professors and students, 
take note:  this is a ripe area for evaluation and policy analysis. 
 
Also for case studies.  At least one successful government reformer has thanked 
Ipaidabribe.  Bhaskar Rao, the commissioner of transportation for the Indian state 
of Karnataka, used data from Ipaidabribe to push through reforms in the motor 
vehicle department.  Licenses are now applied for online, and last year Bangalore 
launched the world’s first automated driving test tracks.  Drivers parallel park, 
navigate a figure eight, and perform other tasks while monitored by electronic 
sensors.   
 
The automated test “totally eliminated the whims and fancies of the motor 
vehicle inspectors,” Mr. Rao recently explained.  “It is videotaped so everyone 
can see the results, and everything is very transparent.” 
From Complaints to Systems Analysis to Solutions 
 
So, the social media are roaring into prominence in the fight against corruption—
and more generally, in the quest for good governance.  The next step is to move 
from complaints to systems analysis, and from there to practical solutions.   
 
Consider “I Propose,” a website run by university students in Mexico City 
(http://www.yopropongo.org/).  People are invited to propose ideas to help solve 
social problems in Mexico City.  Through the site’s blog, Twitter feed, and 
Facebook page, the site’s administrators ask people which problems need to be 
solved and elicit ideas about practical solutions.  
 
Social innovation camps, pioneered in the United Kingdom, have blossomed in 
the last two years in five countries of Eastern and Central Europe, including 
Russia.  The camps convene experts in social problems and solutions along with 
software designers and developers.  The goal:  to mobilize innovations in the 
social media applied to social change.  
http://issuu.com/undp_in_europe_cis/docs/social_media_report_-_external   
 
Think of other possibilities with experts.  Lawyers know how corruption works 
in the legal system.  Accountants know all about tax scams.  Companies involved 
in public works know how procurement can be corrupted.  These kinds of 
corruption often go beyond the street-level varieties experienced by ordinary 
citizens.  Social media could help lawyers, accountants, and business people 
report instances of corruption.  And beyond individual complaints, social media 
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could encourage them to describe how various corrupt systems work.  This 
knowledge could then be used to crowd-source possible improvements. 
What will it take to take these next steps from complaints to solutions?  A 
business model, for one thing.  Ipaidabribe.com in India has an operating budget 
of about USD80,000/year.  It is supported by a foundation set up by Pierre 
Omidyar, a co-founder of Ebay, and it is also part of a well-funded civil-society 
organization.  But many of the social network sites appear lack sustainable 
revenues.  Ipaidabribe in Kenya, for example, is funded from its founder’s 
pockets. 
 
To involve the experts—the lawyers and accountants and business firms—we 
need to make a business case for these steps—and then create a feasible mode of 
collective action.  In many countries, systemic corruption is a kind of equilibrium.  
If your firm won’t pay the bribe, it won’t get a contract.  Ditto, perhaps, for a 
verdict.  No firm wants to pay; it has to, because if it doesn’t, others will.  If firms 
can agree with each other not to pay, however, and their agreement can be 
enforced, then a new, reduced-bribe or no-bribe equilibrium can be the goal. 
 
Consider an example.  Transparency International has pioneered integrity pacts.  
Firms bidding on big contracts each sign a pledge.  It says, in effect, “I promise 
not to bribe, and if any firm that also signs this pledge thinks I bribed, I will open 
my books to inspection.”  This pledge increases transparency and helps firms 
resist extortion.  (“I would love to, but the other firms would find out and I’d be 
ruined.”)       
 
Innovative uses of social media could add further infusions of transparency and 
therefore of commitment.  After all, corruption is a crime of calculation.  If the 
chances go up that bad behavior will be reported, the probability of being caught 
also goes up.  This in turns makes it less desirable to undertake bad behavior. 
 
Speculating, now:  how might the social media enable big steps forward against 
corruption?  One idea is to get together  
 the activists who have founded Ipaidabribe, I Propose, Bribespot, and the 
rest,  
 big players in the social media—the leaders of Facebook and Microsoft, 
Google and Twitter, and  
 leaders in areas of business expertise such as Chambers of Commerce, Bar 
Associations, accountants organizations, and so forth. 
 
These people would consider together how to move from individual complaints 
to systems analysis, and then to solutions.  Design some experiments.  Run some 
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pilot projects.  Detail the business case.  Garner longer-term agreements and 
funding.    
 
Who might convene such meetings?  One idea is an organization like the World 
Economic Forum.  Or perhaps a consortium of universities, particularly schools 
of public policy, business, accounting, and law.  After all, this is the path of much 
of what we do at places like the Lee Kuan Yew School or Claremont Graduate 
University.  We study specific problems.  We try to understand the deeper, 
systemic causes.  And we examine the how-to of possible solutions, in the messy 
dimensions of design, management, and sustainability.   
 
As the example of fighting corruption indicates, the social media offers all of us a 
new and exciting set of tools to gather information, understand how systems 
work, and think through alternative futures, together. 
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POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF  
SOCIAL MEDIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
Dr. Ong Kian Ming1 
 
In almost any country with a relatively high internet penetration rate, each 
person would remember a story of a political gaffe which was spread using a 
social media platform. Indonesians may point to Communications Minister 
Tifatul Sembiring joking about AIDS being ‘caused by the reckless use of one’s 
penis’ on his twitter account. Singaporeans would probably remember Grace Fu, 
a Senior Minister of State pointing out on Facebook of the possibility of ‘a drastic 
change in the standard of living’ of her family because of a 37% pay cut. 
Malaysians may remember a YouTube clip of Jessie Ooi lashing out at Lim Guan 
Eng, the Chief Minister of Penang, during a political debate between him and 
MCA President, Dr Chua Soi Lek. These gaffes, which were played out in public 
through social media, illustrate the growing influence and importance of this 
medium of communication in the larger political landscape.  
While these examples make good headlines, the exact relationship between social 
media and the political landscape in a country is still not very well spelled out. 
This is not surprising given that this relationship is constantly evolving and is 
driven by complicated underlying processes that are not yet properly 
understood. 
But what most people will agree with is that social media is an important 
component of the political process and is thus politically significant and will 
becoming increasingly important moving forward 
In this short essay, I will attempt to examine the following issues pertaining to 
the social media as part of the political landscape in South East Asia: (i) why 
social media is already and will become increasingly influential in the political 
landscape (ii) the relationship between social media and political competition (iii) 
strategies of political outreach using social media and finally (iv) some 
speculative thoughts on the evolution of the influence of social media on politics 
 
                                                        
1
 Ong Kian Ming obtained his PhD in political science from Duke University, where he was a Fulbright 
Scholar. He is now a political analyst and lecturer at UCSI University. He writes regularly for 
Malaysiakini and The Edge Financial Daily. He tweets using the handle imokman and can be reached at 
im.ok.man@gmail.com. 
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Growing Importance of Social Media 
South East Asia has many characteristics which make it fertile ground to examine 
the growing importance of social media on the political landscape. Its population 
of over 600 million makes covers over 5 million square kilometres, 11 countries 
and thousands of linguistic and ethnic groups. The political systems of the 11 
countries are also diverse. Vietnam and Laos has no elections, Malaysia and 
Singapore have had elections that have been dominated by one coalition or party, 
Philippines and Thailand have a longer history of competitive elections and 
Indonesia has transitioned to a competitive democracy since 1998. On the whole, 
most countries in South East Asia are on the path towards more competitive 
elections in the context of a rapid increase in the internet penetration rate and 
hence, the proliferation in the use of social media. At the same time, internet 
censorship is relatively limited and popular social media websites are accessible 
in all of the Southeast Asian countries.
2
 
The proliferation of social media usage can be approximated by examining the 
number of Facebook users by country.  
Table 1: Comparing Facebook and Population Rank in South East Asian 
countries
3
 
No Country
4
 
No of FB 
users 
Population 
(2011) 
Population 
Rank 
Facebook 
Population Rank 
1 Indonesia 43,515,080 237,641,326 4 3 
2 Philippines 27,724,040 94,013,200 12 8 
3 Thailand 14,235,700 65,479,453 21 16 
4 Malaysia 12,365,780 28,334,135 42 17 
5 Vietnam 3,173,480 8,784,0000 13 45 
6 Singapore 2,602,880 5,183,700 116 54 
7 Cambodia 491,480 13,395,682 68 94 
8 Brunei 234,060 422,700 173 118 
9 Laos 155,640 646,5800 103 130 
Source: http://www.socialbakers.com/Facebook-statistics/ (Retrieved on 31 
March, 2012) 
                                                        
2
 Vietnam probably has the most extensive internet censorship in South East Asia. There were 
reports that Facebook was intermittently blocked in 2009. 
3
 Facebook user statistics are not available for Myanmar and East Timor / Timur-Leste 
4
 China bans Facebook although there are still approximately half a million Chinese who manage 
to get around the official firewalls to use access this website.  
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According to Table 1 above, four out of the top 20 countries by Facebook 
population rank are South East Asian countries. Indonesia, despite having a fifth 
the population of India, was only behind India by approximately 2 million 
Facebook users at the time of writing. The other three countries in the top 20 – 
Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia – all have Facebook population ranks which 
are ahead of their population ranks. Malaysia, for example, is ranked 42nd in 
terms of population but comes in at 17 by Facebook population. Of the 9 South 
East Asian countries where Facebook user statistics are available, six have 
Facebook population ranks which are higher than their respective population 
ranks. (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are the three exceptions) 
Multiple factors are working together to drive the increase in social media usage. 
Increasing disposable incomes in a fast growing South East Asia propels demand 
for internet access, which drives more users to popular social media platforms. 
The increase in the number of devices which can be used to access the internet 
such as desktops, laptops, netbooks, mobile internet dongles, Wi-Fi, Ipads, and 
smartphones also drives social media traffic. The proliferation of cyber-cafes, 
especially in semi-urban and rural areas, has also increased the accessibility of 
social media to lower income groups and among the youth.  Certain countries in 
South East Asia stand out in terms of the popularity and ubiquity of certain smart 
phones which are within the incomes of a large majority of the working 
population in these countries. For example, Blackberry is the no.1 smartphone in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.
5
 The high exposure of South East Asian 
countries to trade relationships with the developed world, the exposure to 
Western, especially American, popular culture as well as a large number of 
Western tourists also help drive exposure to social media. 
Facebook user rankings act as a good proxy for the penetration of social media 
given its ubiquity as a social media platform. But other social media platforms for 
different purposes such as social networking (LinkedIn, Google+, Twitter), 
blogging (Blogger, Tumblr, Wordpress), photo / video sharing (YouTube, Vimeo, 
Picasa, Flickr) and news / content sharing (Delicious, digg, pininterest, Reddit) 
continue to gain popularity. The proliferation of different social media platforms 
catering to increasingly diverse audiences will increase not just the breadth of 
social media penetration but also its depth as well in terms of sophistication and 
intensity of use. The increasing ubiquity and diversity of various social media 
platforms coupled with its increased accessibility through Wi-Fi networks, 
smartphones, desktops and laptops increases the network effect of social media 
exponentially. A manifestation of this effect can be seen in how quickly a piece of 
                                                        
5
http://www.cantechletter.com/2012/03/the-blackberry-in-emerging-markets-how-research-in-
motion-can-rebound/ (Retrieved 2nd April, 2012) 
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news or video can go viral since users can share this information through a 
variety of channels and social media platforms. 
The large and growing number of users of social media, especially in South East 
Asia, who are increasingly sophisticated consumers of various social media 
platforms, means that politicians can no longer afford to ignore the significant 
proportion of the population who are ‘citizens’ of the social media universe. 
‘Reaching out’ through social media is increasingly seen as a necessity rather than 
a luxury for the political class. Indeed, in some countries in the region, this is 
already the case. It is no longer sufficient for a politician or political party just to 
have a website. Twitter and Facebook accounts replete with links to blogs and 
YouTube clips and Instagram pictures taken on smartphones are must haves as 
well. 
Political Impact of Social Media 
While most politicians agree that social media cannot be ignored, there is much 
less agreement with regard to the potential political impact of social media. Can 
social media play an instrumental role in toppling non-democratic regimes as 
was speculated in the Arab Spring countries of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya? Could 
non-democratic regimes use social media as a way of monitoring and repressing 
political dissidents? Can social media level the playing field between a political 
incumbent which usually has more resources for publicity at its disposal 
compared the parties in the opposition? 
The Arab Spring has no doubt spurred various studies of the causes of regime 
change in this specific context and within the larger context of causes of 
democratization. These studies will probably emphasize different explanatory 
factors, among which social media will be one of many. My own opinion is that 
some commentators have overplayed the importance of social media in causing 
regime change in the Arab Spring. Other structural reasons such as disunity 
within the ruling regime and the ability to sustain large scale protests (and in 
some cases, armed warfare) in different parts of each country probably played 
more instrumental roles. 
This is not to say that social media only has a limited political impact. There are 
at least three areas in which social media have the potential to have a significant 
political impact: content generation and sharing; networking among the 
politically like-minded; and accentuating the mistakes of politicians, especially 
within the ruling party. 
The ability for internet users to generate their own content through blogs, for 
example, is one of the basic features of the Web 2.0 landscape. This means that 
the content generated by an individual blogger or user has the potential to reach 
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the same online audience as the content generated by a large news organization. 
Social media increases this potential through the ability of users to share this 
content with their circle of friends, acquaintances and followers. It increases the 
ability of the individual blogger or user to ‘push’ his or her content out there in 
cyberspace. This increases the political salience of user-generated content that is 
politically relevant. For example, intelligent and thoughtful critiques, political 
harangues and satire against the policies of an incumbent government can 
quickly gain a large following if it is well publicized through social media. 
Social Media also significantly increases the ability of the politically liked minded 
to network and mobilize. Those who are of the same political inclination are 
much more likely to be ‘friends’ and ‘like’ the same political causes on Facebook 
and to ‘follow’ each other on twitter, for example. They can share critical 
information in closed groups on Facebook and come to each other’s aid in twitter 
‘wars’ with political adversaries. They can mobilize their friends to attend the 
same political events. This networking ability is more significant where there are 
restrictions on political rights and civil liberties which prevent anti-government / 
pro-opposition individuals and groups from networking in the physical world. 
These restrictions are much less effective in cyberspace. Of course, such groups 
can also be ‘infiltrated’ through social media but the larger point regarding the 
ability for the politically like-minded remains. 
Finally, social media can and will accentuate the mistakes made by the political 
class. The political gaffes highlighted at the beginning of this essay are examples 
of mistakes which were widely shared through social media. But these mistakes 
are not confined to political gaffes. More serious mistakes such as evidence of 
police brutality and political corruption can be more easily captured and 
disseminated through social media. Users also have the ability to select, edit and 
enhance information, images and videos in order to increase the effectiveness and 
salience of the intended political message. For example, many videos and images 
taken by protestors in the Bersih 2.0 rally on the streets of Kuala Lumpur on the 
9th of July, 2010, were edited, enhanced and put together as YouTube clips with 
the appropriate background music and text which were then widely 
disseminated through Facebook and twitter. These clips highlighted instances of 
police brutality which made international headlines and put significant pressure 
on the Malaysian government. 
While social media is more likely to emphasize the mistakes made by politicians 
in government, since they are more well-known and have greater public 
exposure, it can also negatively affect those in the opposition. For example, 
damaging video clips featuring someone who looks like the Malaysian 
opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim, having sexual intercourse with a prostitute 
was widely circulated through social media. 
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What is less well specified is the extent to which social media can have an impact 
on election results. While social media is likely to be an important feature of the 
electoral landscape, especially in the context of competitive elections, there still 
has not yet been a definitive case where an incumbent government in South East 
Asia has lost an election purely because of social media. Other more fundamental 
political factors such as corruption, management of the economy, the salience of 
the political messages and positions taken by political parties still hold sway. 
Whether or not this will continue to be the case, especially as social media’s reach 
expands to cover a larger and larger percentage of the voting population, remains 
to be seen. What is more certain is that social media tips the balance in favour of 
the opposition especially in the context of a not fully democratic electoral 
landscape such as the ones found in Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore, though 
to different extent depending on the pervasiveness of social media. 
Political Outreach using Social Media 
There is still a great degree of variety is terms of social media campaign strategies 
employed by the various political parties across South East Asia. Politicians and 
political parties in Singapore, for example, are not heavy users of social media 
despite the country having the highest internet penetration and smart phone 
usage rate in South East Asia. The opposition parties and candidates in Singapore 
have also been relatively slow in using social media for political outreach despite 
this being one of the few channels where it has a ‘natural’ advantage of the ruling 
government. The National Solidarity Party’s Nicole Seah has the most number of 
‘likes’ on Facebook among Singaporean politicians
6
 but that page has relatively 
little activity.  
In contrast, politicians in Malaysia are far more active on Facebook and twitter to 
the extent that statements made by some politicians on twitter are often reported 
as political news. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has a comprehensive 
social media presence in the form of a blog (www.1malaysia.com.my) , a 
Facebook page in English / Malay (almost 1 million likes) and in Chinese (over 
5000 likes), his twitter account (over 500,000 followers) and a YouTube page 
(http://www.YouTube.com/user/najibrazak/featured). His counterpart, 
opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim also has an active social media presence with a 
Facebook page (over 350,000 likes), a twitter account (over 140,000 followers) and 
a blog (www.anwaribrahimblog.com) and a webpage (www.anwaribrahim.com). 
Most of the top political leaders in Malaysia are active in the social media sphere 
with many of them having recently jumped on the twitter bandwagon. 
                                                        
6
 Over 100,000 likes at the time of writing. 
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At its very basic level, social media is used to push out press statements and 
video clips of various political activities of individual politicians and their parties. 
Appealing for campaign funds through social media is also catching on especially 
among opposition politicians operating in less than free and fair electoral 
settings. Savvier politicians are also using social media to build their own brand 
and to increase their own political profile especially at the national level. The 
savviest among these politicians use social media to show that they are ‘in touch’ 
with the people commenting on popular culture such as movies and sports and 
to respond to queries about various political issues using social media. 
Using social media as a campaign tool also comes with its fair share of risk as a 
politician could make mistakes more easily over this more spontaneous channel 
of political outreach as the example of the tweet by Indonesian Communications 
Minister Tifatul Sembiring showed. The ability to be more ‘genuine’ through 
social media is not without its pitfalls. 
Evolution of Social Media and its Political Impact 
The story of social media’s political impact is still being written. Social media 
technology will continue to evolve and become more sophisticated. More 
software applications will be created to be used on various social media 
platforms. Users will also be increasingly sophisticated users of social media. 
Political parties and politicians are usually a step behind the latest technological 
trends. Those who can stay a step ahead of the game by utilizing social media in 
new and creative ways of political outreach including for fundraising, 
recruitment of members, coordination of election workers and so on, will be able 
to reap the political rewards.  
Great political competition in the region will also increase the salience and 
importance of social media as more and more political parties and individual 
politicians recognize the potential of social media as a branding tool. Campaigns, 
especially those at the national level involving presidential elections, for example, 
will have to have increasingly coordinated campaign strategies where social 
media integrated into the political outreach efforts. The media will also have to 
constantly adjust to the changing political landscape as it is influenced by social 
media including the incorporation of social media generated news and feedback 
into the news cycle in the increasingly competitive environment of trying to 
capture a larger share of ‘eyeballs’. 
What this means is that the social media landscape will continue to be a rich area 
of research, investigation and insight for those in the political arena such as 
journalists, analysts, academics and politicians for many years to come. 
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ROLE OF MEDIA IN UNCOVERING POLITICAL CORRUPTION  
IN SOUTH ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Farruque Ahmed1 
 
The electronic media is one of the most powerful tools to disseminate 
information in the shortest possible time. However, there is always debate on 
the neutrality of the media. The media in the West is used as a check on the 
actions of duty-bearers and the public sector however this culture has yet to be 
translated in Asia. The South Asian media also has propensity to favour 
narrow party and personal interests instead of covering public interest issues. 
The Bangladeshi media has undergone significant changes since 1990s. The 
liberalisation of the media has brought more than two-dozen satellite TV 
channels within the last five years. Despite this ‘boom’ in the media industry, 
journalists are reluctant to uncover the misdeeds of politicians because of 
threats and torture. The media has been politicised in Bangladesh as media 
supporting the incumbent party in power works towards exposing the 
perceived misdeeds of the opposition. However, the empirical data shows that 
there is a third category beyond this paradigm, which uncovers the political 
misdeeds across the parties to the wider populace.    
       
Introduction 
Development communication involves creating mechanisms to broaden public 
access to information on development initiatives, activities and results. It is about 
transmitting information and message to generate new knowledge and consensus 
in order to facilitate change among the stakeholders (Mefalopulos 2008). There 
has been a renaissance in the twenty-first century comparable to the early 
decades of the Cold War, when winning hearts and minds of the masses in the 
third world was intrinsically linked to exposure to modern commercial mass 
media. During the 1970s and 1980s, media scholars along with activists 
effectively challenged the motivations behind the paternalistic discourse of 
development with its historical assumptions and imperial ambitions. Responding 
to these critiques, practitioners in the field of development communication began 
to solicit involvement from grassroots organisations and encourage community 
participation to justify more humble goals of localised social change. This 
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newfound humility or self-reflection among conscious development 
communication practitioners and organisations was taking place just as the 
steady pace of liberalisation and commercialisation of new and old media 
systems began to change the terms of both institutional politics and everyday 
cultural practice across post-Cold War market societies (Chakravartty 2009, 37-9). 
The West has dominated literature on print media with a focus on South Asia 
being a recent phenomenon. The “fourth branch of government,” “a political 
institution,” “an integral part of the American political system,” “a tool for 
governing”- all these labels have been used to characterise the power of U.S. 
media (Graber 2007, ix). The term “Asian values” traces back as far as the 1970s 
when it was used to explain the relationship between Asian models of 
modernisation and cultural identities. It was also used in the political discourse 
to explain differences between Asia and the West in concepts and practices of 
human rights, democracy, and freedom. While Asian values were employed to 
support efforts to keep Asia in social, cultural and political policies, they were 
also accused of being exploited by some governments to justify their 
authoritarian rules (Xiaoge 2005, 3). 
The media plays a significant role in curbing the political corruption by 
uncovering the misdeeds of politicians and other government officials. But there 
is no standard definition of political corruption. Transparency International (TI) 
and World Bank define political corruption as the abuse of entrusted power that 
harms the public interest for getting the personal benefits in order to prolong the 
existing power or to accumulate the state resources (Hodess 2004). Based on the 
characteristics of this definition, we can identify political corruption, in general. 
When the political misdeeds are exposed by the investigative reports of the 
media, citizens may change their voting behaviour. Therefore, the media 
coverage of political misdeeds plays a great role in the national election. 
Holbrook, Bizer and Krosnick (2000, 226) argue that news media coverage of 
politics shapes public attitudes in a number of ways. One effect is agenda setting, 
whereby the more coverage the media devote to an issue, the more nationally 
important people perceive the issue to be. Another media effect is priming, 
whereby people judge the performance of government officials based mostly on 
issues heavily covered by the media (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). News media 
coverage can frame an issue by drawing people’s attention to some aspects of the 
issue and ignoring others. It makes government especially salient as a force 
influencing social life. So people who are highly exposed to the media tend to 
credit or blame government more for the country’s fortunes and misfortunes 
(Abramowitz et al.1988). This paper aims to identify role of the media in 
uncovering the political corruption in South Asia, particularly in Bangladesh. 
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Methodology  
This paper is based on mixed methods of both theoretical and empirical data. The 
scholarly literature focuses on the media, corruption, culture and politics in Asian 
context, in general, and Bangladesh, in particular. The empirical data derives 
from a related research project entitled, ‘Political Corruption and the Media in 
South Asia: A Bangladesh Perspective.’ The potential stakeholders in Bangladesh 
are selected following snowball sampling method which uses recommendations 
to find people for this study with the specific range of skills that has been 
determined as being useful, from Non-Government Organisation (NGO) 
workers, civil society professionals, journalists and media professionals. Also, 
two focus group discussions on the same issue have been conducted. The sample 
size for this particular issue including the focus groups is 62. The individual 
interview took place in Dhaka in 2010 and each interview took 30-35 minutes. 
Out of two focus groups, one took place in Moulvibazar district at the semi urban 
area and the other in Kishoregonj district at the rural area. The first group consists 
of 12 members and took about 80-90 minutes and the other is of nine members 
and took 60-70 minutes. Thus, the potential stakeholders from urban, semi urban 
and rural area of Bangladesh provide a comprehensive view on the undertaken 
issue.   
Determinants of Corruption 
In theory, the incidence of corruption can be explained by three types of 
determinants (Brunetti & Weder 2003, 1801-4). The first focuses on the role of 
internal mechanisms such as the recruitment and promotion process in the 
bureaucracy, looking at whether meritocracy or nepotism and incentives, such as 
level of public sector wages within the bureaucracy, affect the incidences of 
corruption. A second branch stresses the role of external mechanisms in checking 
corruption (at least its pervasiveness) such as an independent judiciary or 
watchdog body. Finally, the third branch argues that corruption can be explained 
by more indirect factors, such as culture or the level of rents that can be 
appropriated. Brunetti and Weder also endorse a wide range of scholars like as 
Rauch and Evans (2000), Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Rahman (1986), Ades 
and Di Tella (1999), Lee (1986), Tanzi (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro 
(1995), and Kaufmann (1997) in explaining the behaviour of these determinants. 
Internal Controls of Corruption 
Brunetti and Weder (2003, 1803) argue that all systems and incentives which 
control corruption within the bureaucracy tends to be high in an administrative 
environment where there is a lack of explicit standards of performance which are 
strictly enforced and in an environment where the individual bureaucrat is 
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poorly supervised. Rauch and Evans (2000, 49-71) argue that an important aspect 
of internal control is whether the recruitment and promotion process in the 
bureaucracy is based on meritocracy or on nepotism. They claim that less 
nepotism tends to reduce the probability that internal control is eliminated by 
collusion among bureaucrats, and also they test this point by constructing an 
index of meritocratic recruitment and promotion and showing that it is 
significantly associated with corruption in a sample of less developed countries. 
Rijcheghem and Weder also claim that a low level of public sector wages 
compared to wages in the private sector increases the incentives for bureaucrats 
to accept bribes in less developed countries (2001, 307-31). 
External Controls of Corruption  
Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that a court system where corrupt bureaucrats 
can be easily and effectively sued sharply reduces the potential rewards of 
corruption, and in countries with less-developed checks and balances, other parts 
of the society can play the role of external controller. Rahman (1986) describes 
such a mechanism in the case of Singapore where citizens’ committees were 
established, which enables citizens to vent their grievances and seek redress. He 
argues that an empirical analysis of the effects of external control on corruption is 
difficult since there are few convincing empirical measures for cross-country 
differences of the power of external control mechanisms. Empirical studies such 
as Ades and Di Tella (1999, 982-93) use rather indirect measures such as the 
general level of development and education to capture the ability of the civil 
society to control government performance. They also argue that a free press is 
another potentially powerful external control on corruption. 
Indirect Determinants of Corruption  
Brunetti and Weder further include culture and level of distortions in the 
economy as indirect determinants (2003). Lee (1986) for instance suggests that a 
culture of bureaucratic elitism may lead to a disassociation of civil servants with 
the rest of society and breed corruption. Tanzi (1994, iii) explains clearly that the 
absence of a culture of arm’s length relationships may lead to corruption 
becoming systemic which is likely to grow with time because of the learning-by-
doing quality that it entails. He adds that individuals who begin to bend the rules 
will progressively find it easier on moral or practical grounds to break them; 
others, who, in a different environment, might not have succumbed to 
corruption, will begin to imitate those who have. When it is assumed as Tanzi 
claims "everyone does it," corruption will no longer convey the stigma that it 
does in some countries. Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 599-617) suggest that more 
ethnically diverse countries are prone to particularly harmful forms of 
corruption. Kaufman (1997, 114-31) tests the relationship between an indicator of 
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regulatory discretion and corruption and finds a strong correlation in a small 
sample of developing countries that corruption is negatively associated with 
development objectives everywhere. He also unveils that opportunistic 
bureaucrats and politicians who try to maximise their benefits without regarding 
the impact of perdition on the “size of the overall pie” may account for the 
particularly adverse impact of corruption in some countries of Africa, South Asia, 
and the former Soviet Union, which are very relevant to the case of Bangladesh.  
Role of the Media in Politics 
This article focuses on the mass media, which is intended for a large audience. It 
includes print media such as newspapers and electronic media such as TV, radio, 
internet, phone which covers national and international news. According to 
Habermas (2006, 415), the centre of the political system consists of the familiar 
institutions: parliaments, courts, administrative agencies, and government. Each 
branch is described as a specialised deliberative arena and the corresponding 
output - legislative decisions and political programmes, rulings or verdicts, 
administrative measures and decrees, guidelines, and policies - results from 
different types of institutionalised deliberation and negotiation processes. At the 
periphery of the political system, he claims, the public sphere is rooted in 
networks for wild flows of messages - news, reports, commentaries, talks, scenes 
and images, and shows and movies with an informative, polemical, educational, 
or entertaining content. These published opinions also originate from various 
types of actors; politicians and political parties; lobbyists and pressure groups; or 
actors of civil society. They are selected and shaped by mass media professionals 
and received by broad and overlapping audiences, camps, subcultures, and so 
on. 
Xiaoge (2005, 53) suggests three roles of the press in society advanced by the pro-
government camp is as follows: advocacy of a co-operative role for the press in 
nation building and national development; the role of the press as catalyst for 
social and political change; and the duty of the press to educate instead of merely 
entertain, maintain social stability and racial harmony, and aid in economic 
development and nation building. Also, he prioritises these roles in Asia largely 
in line with social structure, political systems, cultural sensitivity and traditions, 
economic conditions, and historical experiences. 
The media has various roles to play at the different contexts even within the same 
political culture. Sometimes the media plays the role of ‘watchdog’ or public 
sphere where individuals and institutions are supposed to serve, the public 
remain transparent and are held accountable (Coronel 2009, 3). On the other 
hand, Peters (2003, 44) claims that a difficult relationship between journalism and 
political power is a hallmark of democratic society, and to that extent, a tendency 
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to manipulate news and shape the agenda of public debate exists in all societies. 
He also adds that in countries where democratic culture is not well established 
restrictions on media tend to be more explicit and profoundly damaging to 
debate or public engagement. Where the affairs of government or powerful 
interest groups are protected by secrecy, journalists face considerable obstacles - 
and physical risk – if they embark upon investigations that could lead to 
exposing corruption. Yet the media also face challenges within their own ranks.  
Media Ethics and Accountability  
Most work in the field of media ethics focuses on media producers. From such 
early classics as Merrill and Barney (1975) to most recent studies by Christians, 
Ferre and Fackler (1993), most books on media ethics deal with the resolution of 
moral dilemmas media producers face in the execution of their profession. The 
existing codes of professional ethics address the rights and wrongs of 
professional producers. Exploration of media morality almost exclusively deals 
with the moral problems of the messengers and their messages. Many journalists’ 
organisations have adopted codes of ethics for the self-regulations of professional 
conduct. Press councils around the world deliberate and judge the standards by 
which producers should behave. A key concern of this producer-centred activity 
in media ethics is the quest for professional freedom, quality and responsibility in 
media performance.    
Many reasons account for why governments are better informed than voters and 
hence act on the basis of privileged information. For example, if a bridge or dam 
is being built, citizens can only ascertain whether the authorities have paid the 
proper attention to the relevant costs and benefits through media scrutiny. 
Similarly when natural disasters strike, active mass media increases the ability for 
citizens to monitor their representatives’ effort to protect the vulnerable and to 
provide disaster relief and other things. This is particularly important in low-
income countries, where citizens rely so strongly on the state for social protection. 
Suppose, for example, that in a region of a country containing 50 villages, only 
one is hit by a flood. Without the media only those directly affected can observe 
the government’s actions; however, mass media enable citizens in all 50 villages 
to observe whether the government is responsive. This raises politicians’ 
incentives to respond, because citizens in the other 49 villages may use this 
information in their voting decisions (Besley et al. 2002, 45-6).   
Ownership and Control of the Media 
In modern economies and societies, the availability of information is central to 
better decision making by citizens and consumers. In political markets, citizens 
require information about candidates to make intelligent voting choices. In 
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economic markets, including financial markets, consumers and investors require 
information to select products and securities. The availability of information is a 
crucial determinant of the efficiency of political and economic markets (Islam et 
al. 2002). The media serve as the intermediaries that collect information and make 
it available to citizens and consumers. Throughout the world, governments 
regulate media using measures ranging from content restrictions in broadcasting 
licenses to constitutional freedom of expression provisions. In some cases, 
ownership is influenced directly by regulation (Djankov et al. 2003). 
A World Bank study finds that greater freedom of the press is associated with 
lower perceived corruption greater level of government ownership of the media 
is associated with less free press, and dissemination of less information relevant 
to market. It also finds that government ownership of the media is associated 
with negative political and social outcomes, namely more corruption, inferior 
governance, less developed financial markets and poorer education and health 
outcomes economies (Winfield 2006). Moreover, a lack of diversity of media 
ownership threatens to stifle the freedom of expression essential to informed 
public debate. The classic situation in which media owners interfere with their 
journalists' activities is when the government itself owns all or most of a country's 
television, radio and press. Indeed, evidence collected from 97 countries suggests 
that state-owned media tend, in general, to be less effective than private media in 
monitoring government activities (WDR 2002). 
 
Envelope culture in Asian journalism 
Salaries for media workers are poor in many Asian countries, leading journalists 
to seek supplementary forms of income, with the envelope culture being one 
significant source of funding. The envelope culture refers to envelopes containing 
money or other valuable gifts that individuals give to journalists at interviews 
and press conferences. The countries with the best‐documented envelope cultures 
include Indonesia and the Philippines, although envelope giving has been noted 
in countries as far a field as China, South Korea and Pakistan (Romano 2009, 9). 
Not all journalists rationalise the envelope as being part of a culture of 
gift‐giving. In many countries, it results from direct corruption and profiteering. 
This occurs in nations like Kazakhstan, where government and business figures 
pay certain journalists to write positive stories about their performance (Kenny 
and Gross 2008, 517). Even if the envelope does stem from cultural traditions, it 
should be recognised that not all forms of gift‐giving and patron-client 
relationships are automatically acceptable behaviours for journalists and other 
democratic actors. Most cultures have notions of public responsibility and define 
as inappropriate any behaviour by public officials that deviates from accepted 
laws and norms, or involves misuse of public resources and powers (in contrast 
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to use of one’s own personal assets) with the aim of serving private ends 
(Theobald 1990, 40-5). 
According to Romano, various forms of envelope journalism and journalistic 
corruption are widespread in those Asian countries that suffer from entrenched 
corruption in the political- economic spheres and/or large, low‐paying 
bureaucracies. He claims the dilemma lies in the nature of patron-client 
relationships. Once a relationship is established, both parties must maintain 
certain unspoken expectations or risk losing the connection. The unspoken 
expectations of many sources become clear when one considers that most 
envelopes come from sources who contact journalists seeking to gain or avoid 
publicity; they rarely give envelopes when they are contacted regarding stories 
generated by the reporters’ own initiative. Dissatisfied sources do not demand 
their money back, but the envelope relationship creates a psychological demand 
on journalists who do not want to hurt someone who has been generous to them 
(2003, 151-63).    
“The political situation in South Asia is deteriorating," Shawn Crispin, one of the 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Asia programme consultant, informed 
Reuters after the group announced its second "impunity index" (Mogato 2009, 1). 
These countries are entering now into eras of sustained armed conflict and 
journalists are immediately at risk. Crispin added that the state directly targeted 
some journalists in Sri Lanka while in Pakistan, journalists were caught between 
opposing political forces. Pakistan has 10 cases of unsolved journalist killings and 
is ranked 10th in the index. The situation in Pakistan is quickly deteriorating. 
There are more and more journalists getting caught, not necessarily in the 
crossfire itself, but by competing groups. Six of 14 states in the index are from 
South Asia, including India, which has a functioning legal and law enforcement 
systems, and it is ranked 14th with seven cases of unsolved murders. Other South 
Asian states on the CPJ list are Afghanistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. However, 
there are also complaints that many newspapers slant their coverage in favour of 
the narrow party and personal interests of the newspaper owners and their 
conglomerates, and that the profit motive leads them to neglect to cover issues 
relevant to the wider populace (Vilanilam 2005). 
State-Media Relations in Bangladesh  
Journalists and others are potentially subject to incarceration when private 
parties in Bangladesh file criminal libel proceedings. Members of Parliament 
(MPs) from the ruling party have, in the past, filed separate criminal libel suits 
against several newspapers after articles were published that the politicians 
viewed as false and defamatory. The journalists in all cases received anticipatory 
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bail from the courts, and none of the cases moved to trial. Sedition charges 
remained pending, and those persons accused remained on bail. In November 
2000, a new sedition charge (there was another sedition charge already pending 
against him) was filed against an editor, Bahaudin, for publishing a parody of the 
national anthem mocking the Prime Minister. When the police arrived at 
Bahauddin's residence to arrest him, he was not there, so they arrested his 
brother, Mainuddin, who was not eligible for bail because of the Special Power 
Act (SPA). Mainuddin was not charged; after 16 days he was released. Charges 
against editor Bahauddin remain pending in both sedition cases (Press 2011). 
The above source also claims that all print journalists practice self-censorship to 
some degree, and commonly are reluctant to criticise politically influential 
personalities in both the government and the opposition. Many journalists cite 
fear of possible harassment, retaliation, or physical harm as a reason to avoid 
sensitive stories. The source further claims that violent attacks on journalists and 
newspapers, and efforts to intimidate them by government leaders, political 
party activists, and others frequently occur. It adds that violence against 
journalists has increased since 2001. Moreover, political parties and persons 
acting on their behalf conducted attacks both on media offices; individual 
journalists were targeted for their unfavourable news reporting. These crimes 
largely remained unresolved and the perpetrators, often identified by name or 
party affiliation in press reports, have not been held accountable. Attacks by 
political activists on journalists also are common during times of political street 
violence, and some journalists were injured in police actions.  
The Bangladeshi media have undergone great changes since the 1990’s. In a 
changed global economic and political situation, Bangladesh went through media 
liberalisation along with the market. The government of Bangladesh had always 
heavily controlled the state owned radio and television channel. As a result, in 
1992 foreign channels were introduced to the Bangladeshi audience, who had 
only experienced State owned Bangladesh Television (BTV) until then. Within the 
last five years, the number of satellite TV channels and FM radio channels has 
increased to about 12 and six respectively. According to the National Media 
Survey 2002, the national reach of the media is composed of radio 19 percent, 
television 48 percent, newspapers/magazines 20 percent, and cinema 13 percent 
(NMS 2002) shown in Figure 1. 
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"Figure 1: Media Exposure in Bangladesh" 
 
   Source: National Media Survey 2002 
Just after 1990, there was a ‘boom’ of print media. In 1990, the beginning of 
globalisation and ending of direct and indirect military rule, of more than one 
decade, occurred simultaneously. On 6 December 1990, the first Caretaker 
Government
2
 (CTG), which was formed to arrange a free and fair election in the 
process of democratisation, withdrew a newspaper control regulation from SPA, 
1974. With this step, obtaining registration for a newspaper became easier. In a 
country of 162 million people, though only about 1.3 million copies of 
newspapers are sold daily; there were 300 dailies in Bangladesh at the end of 
2000. In terms of electronic media, there existed only one State-owned television 
and one radio channel. But all print media, is privately owned, mostly by 
corporate companies, which replaced politicians (Haq 2007). In a democratic 
society, the media is expected to act as the powerful guardian of public interest 
against government arbitrariness and bureaucratic high-handedness. But in 
Bangladesh the media could not play this role because past military takeovers 
thwarted democracy (Siddiquee 1999, 95). 
Politicisation of the Media in Bangladesh  
Zafarullah and Siddiquee (2001) claim that electronic media has always been state 
property and continually abused by all ruling parties in Bangladesh. The print 
media, on the other hand, has shown fortitude and buoyancy in investigating and 
exposing both political and administrative corruption. The latter has been 
playing a noteworthy role in highlighting public grievances and mal-
administration. Some newspapers are active and well timed in publishing reports 
on bureaucratic irregularities, highhandedness, and abuse of power, 
mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption. To some extent, this acts as a 
deterrent for public servants as they constantly remain cautious while performing 
                                                        
2
 After the end of tenure of the political government in Bangladesh, the CTG takes over the power 
of the government to arrange the next parliament election within 90 days. It is an interim type of 
government. 
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their official responsibilities. However, the impact of such exercises is bound to 
be limited. The authors also claim that having no executive authority, the media 
and civil society cannot go beyond exposing cases of corruption except in 
arousing public opinion against the vice, and instances of remedial measures 
initiated by the government following reports by the print media are few and far 
between (2001, 476-7).  
Since the government permitted private satellite TV channels a decade ago, a 
massive investment in the TV production and advertisement sector has been 
systematically facilitated by the dominant political and commercial elites of the 
country. The private TV stations are owned by the economic elite – invariably 
connected to the two most dominant political parties – Awami League and 
Bangladesh Nationalists Party (BNP), while most of the channels are backed by 
the politicians and industrialists of the BNP (Rahman 2009). The AL media gives 
priority in publishing the misdeeds of BNP leaders and its party activists while 
the BNP media publishes the misdeeds of AL leaders and party activists to 
tarnish the images of that political party. The main Islamic party in Jamaat-e-
Islam Bangladesh (JIB) also has its affiliated media house. Party affiliation of 
some of the media owners has been shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Party Affiliation of the Media Owners in Bangladesh 
  Media Owner Party Affiliation 
1 NTV Mosaddak Ali Falu 
 
BNP 
2 Rtv BNP 
3 Islamic TV Said Iskandar BNP 
4 Independent TV Beximco Group AL 
5 Desh TV HRC Group AL 
6 Diganta TV Diganta Media Corporation JIB 
         Source: Field data 
Like other professional organisations in Bangladesh, the media is politically 
divided into two major parties (AL and BNP) though there is a third category 
which does not follow the dictated party politics. People in this third category 
cannot trust the news from a media group owned by a politician, which usually 
covers up corrupt activities of political member associated with the party. On the 
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other hand, during the CTG period (2006-08) both the print and electronic media 
enjoy full freedom to uncover the political corruption in Bangladesh. The cross-
cutting effect of AL media and BNP media is that the politics in Bangladesh 
becomes mediated where the media has the most important source of 
information and vehicle of communication between the governors and the 
governed (Bennett and Entman 2001). 
In such a situation, people depend on the media for information about politics 
and society, just as politicians and other powerful elites depend on the media for 
information about peoples’ opinions and trends in society, and for reaching out 
to people. Stated differently, the media mediates between the citizenry, on one 
hand, and the institutions involved in government, electoral process, or, more 
generally, opinion formation, on the other. Politics is therefore described as 
mediated whenever the mass media are the main channels through which politics 
is communicated and when, as a consequence, the depictions of “reality” that are 
conveyed through the mass media presumably have an impact on how people 
perceive “reality” (Stromback 2008, 230).  
 
The Third Category of Media Houses in Bangladesh 
 
When the media plays its watchdog role and publishes the investigative reports 
on political misdeeds of the party in power along with public grievances and 
sufferings, then people can realise its accuracy as it contains their voices in 
developing countries like Bangladesh, where a third category of the media 
houses flourishes since the last decade of 20th century (Table 2).     
Table 2: The 3rd Category of Media Houses in Bangladesh 
 
 Media Owner Party Affiliation 
1 The Daily Star Transcom Group N/A 
2 The Prothom Alo Transcom Group N/A 
3 The New Age Holiday Publication Ltd. N/A 
4 The New Nation Mainul Hosein N/A 
5 Maasranga TV Square Group N/A 
6 bdnews24.com Bangladesh News 24 Hours Ltd. N/A 
       Source: Field data 
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The third category media houses expose political misdeeds through unbiased 
reporting in Bangladesh, and online newspapers and websites are a vital force to 
this category. Though they do not have political patronage directly, they depend 
on their business conglomerations, circulations, and advertisements. They are 
becoming emerging powers in the society, as people trust them. They face the 
dominant political parties in Bangladesh by their ethical and neutral stances, and 
find that the two dominant political parties (AL & BNP) do not sustain their 
power and position consecutively two terms after 1991 due to their misdeeds. 
The latest example of the emerging media power in Bangladesh is the 
Narayangonj City Corporation Election (held on 30 October 2011) where the AL 
mayor candidate Shamim Osman (known as 'godfather' and convicted for 
criminal offences by the court) was defeated by Selina Hayat Ivy by 101,343 votes 
(BEC 2011). The people of Narayanganj rejected the candidate of AL, giving 
mayor-elect Selina Hayat Ivy a relatively clean team to run the corporation (Star 
Report 2011). The third category media exposed concerned citizens' opinions 
against the AL candidate before the election which helped voters vote for Mrs. 
Ivy, the first elected woman mayor in Bangladesh.           
This example bears a great significance in implementing people's aspiration, in 
shaping the democracy in the country, and also in flourishing the third category 
media in Bangladesh. Though the dominant political parties try to escape the 
unbiased reporting of their misdeeds, the peripheral smaller parties highly praise 
such reporting. The third category media becomes very vibrant in uncovering the 
political corruption through investigative reporting, on one hand, and it educates 
the masses in the vocabulary of democracy through campaign for change 
(www.badlejoabadledao.com), on the other.     
Empirical Data Analysis 
The empirical data has been collected from the potential stakeholders in 
Bangladesh through interviews and focus group discussions as stated earlier. 
One of the editors of a national daily newspaper published from Dhaka responds: 
'If we want to understand the media of Bangladesh, we need to go back at the 
Pakistan regime (1947-1970), when the media plays one kind of role where 
the mainstream press was an extension of the mainstream nationalist politics 
in its editorial, commentary and other writings. But when the nation state 
was established in 1971, its role changed and then different classes, different 
vested groups and different ideologies worked within the same nation state. 
There are different types of media houses with different types of ideologies. 
Generally three types of media organisations are now working in Bangladesh, 
which is a pathologically political divided society as the doctors, teachers, 
engineers, lawyers, and businessmen are politically divided. As mentioned 
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earlier, the journalists are also divided into unions along with political party 
lines the bipartisan while the third category journalists are decreasing. He 
emphasises that the rewards of journalists in Bangladesh depend on how 
much s/he is involved to party politics whereas the political parties are mostly 
corrupt. However, he claims that the media becomes recently very vibrant in 
Bangladesh.’ 
One of the media professionals at the University of Dhaka responds that the 
media is supposed to play a watchdog role, but it compromises with politicians 
or businessmen for exposing the misdeeds of large-scale corruption in 
Bangladesh. He claims that journalists often collude with the private sector to 
hide its illegal activities, which adds institutional corruption in the society. Both 
the print and visual media, he adds, fail to expose political corruption as many of 
the owners have political affiliations.  
A senior staff reporter of a national daily responds that it would be unfair to 
tarnish the journalism in Bangladesh due to a few rotten eggs and claims that 
media has lost its integrity may be an exaggeration in uncovering the political 
misdeeds. He adds, if one media publishes the corrupt activity of a particular 
political party but the same media conceals the corruption of another political 
party for its group’s interest. He also opines that there are some newspapers or 
journalists, whose motive is only to make money, and they are substandard in 
journalism, however, they are not the mainstream journalists in Bangladesh, and 
mostly mainstream media does not compromise with any party for exposing 
corruption. 
A member of the civil society as interviewee expresses that the primary 
responsibility of journalists remains holding duty bearers to account but this is 
subsumed by commercial purposes. He adds that the media cannot play its 
proper role to expose public sufferings of the country. Even the successive elected 
governments in Bangladesh, he claims, are failed to make a level playing field for 
democracy as the party in power always tries to oppress the opposition, and uses 
the state-run media as its mouthpiece, but the irony is that people do not believe 
the state-run media.  
Some civil society professionals respond that political corruption becomes 
institutionalised in Bangladesh. The media is one of the key institutions of the 
National Integrity System (NIS), which plays a very important role together with 
civil society in bringing out stories of corruption. It is often a challenging matter 
as many serious problems arise with issues of media ownership and corporate 
interest. However, some of the newspapers have been playing a very significant 
role, such as the Daily Prothom Alo and the Daily Star. They claim that the media 
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can play a negative role where journalists can extort money from public figures 
with the threat of publishing libellous articles.  
Civil society professionals as interviewees stress that many journalists in 
Bangladesh practice ‘yellow journalism.’ They argue that if the media plays its 
watchdog role fearlessly, unbiased and neutrally, then democratisation of the 
country can be accelerated and the media can attain the strength to fight against 
corruption. They add that the media is a powerful instrument in uncovering all of 
the misdeeds in society. They claim the Bangladeshi media plays a vibrant role in 
raising awareness among citizens and fight corruption. Moreover, one former 
adviser to the CTG responds as interviewee that though the media in Bangladesh 
is highly politicised, the public depend on the third category of the media to 
know the actual incident. He adds that about 160-170 daily newspapers are 
published from Dhaka. He claims that seventy-five percent of the journalists do 
not receive a salary and the media itself is involved in corruption rather than 
exposing it. He substantiates that many newspapers have registration and make a 
few number of circulations only to serve their own purposes by rent seeking 
which is dangerous for the nation.  
 
Some of focus group participants say that they do not see any investigative report 
on politicians when they are in power, but only see the reports once the CTG has 
taken power from the government. But under a CTG, the media enjoys full 
freedom to report on corruption of the former ministers, MPs and other 
politicians without any interference. They claim that ministers, MPs, other 
politicians and government officials extract, or help to grab the government land, 
recruit staffs for public sector. Also, they influence or take bribes and help their 
clients to get big contracts, permits or licenses. Moreover, when the political 
government is in power, the media cannot play its role properly because of 
political influence, nepotism, and personal benefits. However, most of the 
participants in focus groups strongly emphasise that in spite of the influences of 
two dominant political parties in Bangladesh, a section of the media upholds its 
neutrality and unbiased stance because of the Bangladeshi readers who are the 
main driving force of this third category along with the civil society and NGOs.    
Conclusion 
Political corruption remains a major issue in the domestic politics of most South 
Asian states (Singh 2003, 153). The media acts as the indirect deterrent of 
corruption in Bangladesh. Some newspapers have shown social responsibilities 
or social accountability through expressing social needs, worries, and political 
misdeeds but many of them are only to serve the commercial purposes. Also, 
there is accusation of rent seeking against some newspapers. However, it keeps a 
sceptical eye on the powerful, guarding the public interest and protecting it from 
  
 
 
 
  35 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS VOL. 5. NO. 1 
incompetence, corruption, and misinformation. The empirical data reveals that 
among three categories of the media, first and second categories are biased to 
their affiliated political parties (AL, BNP and JIB). Only the third category is 
engaged in uncovering misdeeds of political parties and politicians across the 
government in Bangladesh. The vibrant media is also engaged in educating 
masses against the adverse impacts of corruption. Moreover, people can realise 
the pervasiveness of political corruption in the country from the AL media for 
BNP misdeeds, and from the BNP media for AL misdeeds. Thus, people can 
compare it to the third category of the media, which is unbiased and a vital force 
for the democracy and governance as well.    
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RETHINKING PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Miguel Antonio B. Garcia1 
 
This essay attempts to challenge conventional perspectives in crafting 
Philippine development policies. The Philippines has been enmeshed in a 
development paradox, where the country has promising potential to develop 
given its pool of human and natural resources, but has failed to take off and 
develop due to persistent systemic problems in the country’s political and 
economic institutions. The essay explores various dimensions in development 
economics, political economy, Philippine history, and Philippine culture in 
order to shed some light on the country’s development puzzle. From these 
reflections, this paper argues that development policy can only be relevant and 
effective if the policies include Filipino behaviour and institutions into the 
analytical framework. However, to do that, policy makers need to rethink core 
economic principles, public policy prescriptions, and development strategies. 
The fast-emerging perspective in new institutional economics is seen as a 
suggested framework in fine-tuning policies to fit Filipino institutional and 
behavioural contexts. 
 
Introduction 
  
Many scholars and policymakers have labelled the Philippines as a ‘development 
puzzle’ or as the ‘sick man of Asia’, because of the complex intertwining 
dimensional problems affecting the country (Balisacan and Hill, 2003; Usui, 2011; 
Nye, 2011a). As a state, an economy, and a society, the Philippines has been 
trapped in a development dilemma: stagnating economic growth, debilitating 
corruption in government, and growing disillusionment among the Filipino 
people regarding the country’s future. The consequences brought about by the 
economic, political, and social crises are disconcerting.  
 
On the economic dimension, Nye (2011a) illustrated that these complications 
resulted from increased poverty and economic inequality, high unemployment, 
sluggish and disproportional economic growth, low investment spending, a 
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shrinking industrial sector, distortional and high minimum wages, and the 
continuing diaspora of high-skilled Filipino workers overseas. 
On the political sphere, the Philippine political arena is dominated by elite 
groups who control the country’s resources (Hutchcroft, 1998; De Dios and 
Hutchcroft, 2003; North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). With rent extraction as their 
primary objective, the country’s elites do not hesitate to organise the bureaucracy 
or design policies that cater to their interests (Hutchcroft, 1998). Thus, there is no 
coincidence that corruption continues to persist, resulting in an inefficient 
government bureaucracy, inadequate supply of infrastructure, and policy 
instability (De Dios and Ferrer, 2001).  
 
Finally, Western scholars and commentators in comparative politics and social 
history would characterise Philippine society as ‘juvenile’ (Karnow, 1989), 
racially deficient and politically inexperienced (Ileto, 2001), run by factional 
loyalties (McCoy, 1980), and dishonesty (Lawless, 1969, cited in Pe-Pua and 
Protacio-Marcelino, 2000). 
 
However, characterising the Philippines as inherently problematic is short-
sighted. Above all, the failure among academic and policy circles in making sense 
of the problems in the Philippines only implies the insufficiency of their 
theoretical paradigms. The theoretical lenses of what is seen of the country 
cascades into the policies it craft and the expectations it sets on the country’s 
development path. Furthermore, this paper makes the case that the Philippines 
should be explicit about its theoretical lenses. 
 
Following North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), it is argued that understanding the 
role of the elite, and the country’s institutions holds the key in shedding light on 
the Philippines’ development problems. The important message this essay seeks 
to propagate is simple: what is needed is a rethinking of conventional views and 
explore alternative views and strategies. 
 
This paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 explores the literatures 
in comparative politics and political economy in the Philippines to survey the 
theoretical and empirical advances related to Philippine development. Section 3 
assesses the limitations of the neoclassical paradigm in development policy. 
Section 4 takes a reflective tour on Western perceptions of Filipino culture and 
the critiques that has been raised by Filipino scholars. Sections 5 and 6 will 
challenge existing conventions by rethinking fundamental public policy 
objectives and the whole strategy of development in general.  
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The Philippines’ Development Path So Far 
 
In the context of development in Asia, the Philippine economy lags behind many 
of its Asian neighbours like China, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and even 
Vietnam. Moreover, the Philippines, immediately after the Second World War, 
was in a relatively better position compared to these countries. It had a well-
educated labour force and strong commercial and military support from the 
United States (Balisacan and Hill, 2003). But as time passed, its neighbours, 
especially China, South Korea, Thailand, and even Vietnam, have gradually 
overtaken the Philippines in terms of per capita income.  
 
While many of its neighbouring countries are moving forward, the Philippines 
has been left behind in the development race. However, along the way, the 
country has learned  from misguided economic policies brought about by import-
substitution and debt-driven growth, systemic political failures with the 
dominance of the local elite in business and government, and the shorting 
comings of the political, legal, and economic institutions since the fall of 
Ferdinand Marcos and the rise of Corazon C. Aquino (De Dios and Hutchcroft, 
2003; Balisacan and Hill, 2003; Hutchcroft, 1998).  
 
A truly historical study of development in the Philippines, dating back to its 
colonial period, shows a similar story Corpuz (1989a, 1989b, 1997), Cruz (2010), 
and Hutchcroft (1998, 2000) showed how the seeds of corruption took root as 
Spain looted the country’s resources and kept institutions frail for three hundred 
years while theUnited States opened opportunities for the local elite to take hold 
of the government bureaucracy during its fifty years of colonisation. Cruz (2010), 
for example, following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), revealed how 
high mortality among Spanish settlers discouraged colonial masters from 
developing local institutions, particularly property rights, but instead, looted the 
land of its gold, silver, and other valuable resources and brought them back to 
Spain.  
 
As Cruz (2010) further elaborated, these exploitative institutions only 
strengthened when the United States took over as colonisers. Hutchcroft (1998) 
writes that the powerful property-owning business Spanish mestizos2 plundered 
the state to maintain their business interests. The land-owning mestizos would 
extend their influence over the local government when the American government 
realised they needed the influence and power of the elites to control the 
Philippine archipelago (Hutchcroft, 2000). However, this divide-and-rule strategy 
                                                        
2
 Editor’s note: mestizo is a term to describe Filipinos with mixed Spanish ancestry.  
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would have serious consequences over time. After independence from the United 
States, Fabella (1999) writes that corruption was already so entrenched within the 
country’s bureaucracy that everyone was involved, from the President down to 
the barangay3 captain. 
 
Fleshing out the patterns within the historical data, shows that the problem was 
not solely economic, but also political, social, and perhaps even psychological. De 
Dios and Hutchcroft (2003) and de Dios (2009) were able to sketch the 
relationship between periods of economic and political instability, particularly 
the country’s fragile economic health during several coup attempts in the Aquino 
administration, the onset of the Asian financial crisis, the impeachment crisis of 
the Estrada administration, and the alleged cheating and corruption scandals 
during the Arroyo administration. The frailty of the country’s political 
institutions, explains de Dios (2009) and de Dios and Ducanes (2011), deters 
investments and constrains the Philippines from any possibility of sustaining 
economic growth. 
 
Disappointed with the country’s political failures to establish genuine democratic 
institutions, and considering that the Philippines was the first country to gain 
democracy in Asia, Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003) pointed out the deepening 
patron-clientele linkages in Philippine politics. Nye (2011a) lamented that unless 
it reforms the malfunctions of the its political institutions and agencies that have 
caused the country’s economic deterioration through specific, not one-size-fits-
all, policy measures, the country will never escape from its current state of 
political and economic obstacles. 
 
In sum, the fundamental problem in Philippine development and its political 
economy is systemic: fixing either the markets or the government is not even a 
necessary condition, because the Philippine government and its market economy 
never had a well-coordinated set of institutions to begin with. It is not 
coincidental that most of the members of the first Philippine Assembly were 
landowners who captured most of the seats in the legislature (Hutchcroft, 2000). 
The logic behind this composition did not arise out of any democratic process, 
but from a political concession between the American government and the 
landed elite to establish its rule in the Philippines. The roots of institutional 
failure had already burgeoned since then. 
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 Editor’s note: barangay is the lowest level of governance in the Philippines, equivalent to a town.  
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The Failings of the Neoclassical Lens in Development Policy 
 
The problems currently facing the Philippines cannot be well understood when 
considered through only one theoretical lens. As pointed out in the previous 
section, political factors have to be taken into account. At present, neoclassical 
economics has been the dominant lens (Cohn, 2007; Hill and Myatt, 2010) to 
analyse Philippine development policies. Many within the economics discipline 
have complained about the myopic lens of mainstream neoclassical economics, 
particularly on the discipline’s oversimplified assumptions of human behaviour, 
its failure to reconcile differing perspectives among the social sciences, and its 
overuse and even misuse, of mathematical methods in developing theory (Hill 
and Myatt, 2010; Cohn, 2007; Keen, 2001; Lawson, 2003; Hausman, 2008; 
Ioannides and Nielsen, 2007; McCloskey, 1983). 
 
Economists from the heterodox perspective would point out that neoclassical 
economics is suffering from a theoretical schizophrenia between Smithian 
microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics (Hill and Myatt, 2010; Cohn, 
2007; Snowdon and Vane, 2005).  Neoclassical microeconomic theory has been 
criticised for its homo economicus assumptions regarding human rationality 
(Simon, 1957; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Ariely, 2008, 2010), 
the utilitarian philosophy in consumer theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001; 
Easterlin, 2000, 2001, 2003), and the overly simplistic view of the firm as a 
production function (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Moreover, there is the 
never-ending debate between the Rational Expectations and Keynesian schools in 
macroeconomic theory (Cohn, 2007; Snowdon and Vane, 2005). 
 
The core criticism among heterodox economists is that mainstream economics at 
present has grossly deviated from its original tenet of understanding economic 
systems and human behaviour. However, what has been focused on has been the 
obsession for economics to climb up the pedestal of natural sciences, most 
especially having economic methods become as rigorous as that of physics 
(Reinert, 2007; Keen, 2001). Coase (1998) would qualify that formalising economic 
theory into mathematical terms is not really the issue, but insisting on formalising 
them without actually studying the real nature of human behaviour in the 
economic system is cause for concern. 
 
Particularly, the present theoretical corpus in economics is built from the 
assumption of rationally-choosing and utility-maximising individuals. (Cohn, 2007; 
Hill and Myatt, 2010). Market failures, animal spirits, irrational exuberance, and 
the revelation of bounded (limited) and even procedural (rule-of-thumb) rationality 
have sparked debates over conventions of relying on the view of ‘rational’ people 
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as offered by the prevailing economic orthodoxy (Keynes, 1936; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Kreps, 1990; Shiller, 2000).  
 
The present neoclassical paradigm—as it holds on to its scientific and positivist 
veil—has no regard for human dignity simply because it is already crossing over 
the boundaries of the normative and the unscientific. To neoclassical eyes, human 
dignity is a value judgment and the positivist enterprise in neoclassical 
economics refuses touch anything value-laden. However, this is simply 
erroneous. Even if the mainstream economists refuse to see them, value 
judgments are at the core of every economic theory. Notions of individual liberty 
and freedom, as subsumed in the neoclassical ideals of perfectly competitive 
markets, are assumptions silently tucked under the neoclassical rug to justify the 
rationality to rule over markets and society. In fact, this is the first-order 
requirement of commutative justice, a value judgment, and the provision of 
ordinary public goods that Smith outlined in his Wealth of Nations (de Dios, 2009). 
 
The heterodox perspective points out the need to understand the limits of human 
cognition and the complexity of the institutions people face (Hill and Myatt, 2010; 
North, 2005; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). In the context of development policy, this 
is what Banerjee and Duflo (2011) concluded about the poor: the poor remain 
poor not because of an inherent mental or physical disability, but because the 
basic institutions are not working. Thus, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) argue that 
policies and institutions should be engineered to expand the horizons of the poor 
beyond the cognitively taxing exercise of trying to make ends meet and instead 
meeting towards higher-order goals.  
 
Following Sen (1999) and Keynes (1930), these basic institutions free individuals 
from having to think about the basic necessities of life . These institutions allow 
individuals to pursue higher-order goals. From the many randomised controlled 
trials they conducted across India, Africa and Latin America, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011) conclude that improving basic institutions can cause significant 
improvements in the standard of living among the poor. With this in mind, 
development policy is only relevant and effective when political and social 
institutions satisfy one’s basic needs, allowing for more focused attention on 
other personal goals.  
 
Banerjee and Duflo’s (2011) key message is restoring human dignity back to the 
poor and into economic analysis. The poor should never be viewed as ignorant, 
uneducated or dependent upon dole-out programmes. In general, human dignity 
thrives as long as it has secured the minimum level of absolute nutritional, 
cognitive, and emotional necessities. This is Sen’s (1985) proposal that; human 
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development should be based on addressing functionings in order to achieve our 
capabilities. 
 
With this in mind, development policy should be built upon a clear foundation of 
human dignity. But, at present, there is a problem with the dominating 
neoclassical paradigm. In neoclassical economics, the pursuit of self-interest is the 
fuel for economic movement: efficiency is the rule of the game, and economic 
growth is the ultimate destination for any fledging economy. It would seem that 
human dignity—where it implicitly rests on collective participation of 
individuals and society—is merely a residual, rather than the primary objective, 
to development from a neoclassical perspective.  
 
Finding the Real Filipino in Politics and History 
 
Our discussion now explores how human behaviour and human dignity are 
essential when crafting development policies. Throughout the comparative 
politics and psychology literature in the Philippines, the discourse about Filipino 
behaviour shows a very telling picture of the Filipino. This is why Ileto (2001) 
criticised Western scholarship studying comparative politics in the Philippines 
for essentialising Filipino political behaviour by illustrating Philippine political 
dynamics as inferior in contrast to the Western notions of politics. Ileto (2001) 
raises sweeping criticisms against Western political scholarship, particularly that 
of Karnow (1989), Owen and Cullinane (1971), May (1984, 1988), McCoy (1980, 
1994), Lande (1965), Cullinane (1994), in boxing Filipino political behaviour with 
American ideals.  
 
Overall, Ileto objects to how Western scholarship’s use of theoretical models 
undermines the complexity of the pulitika in the Philippines.4 Ileto stripped down 
the rhetoric the scholars used in framing an illustration of Filipino political 
behaviour. Ileto does not hesitate to attack Western scholars as he begins to 
debunk Karnow’s accusation that the root of the Philippine problem is based on 
the behaviour of Filipinos as “juveniles, dominated by their emotions and 
untrammelled personal ambitions” (2001, p. 2). These behaviours, according to 
Karnow, stems from the “complicated and often baffling web of real and ritual 
kinship ties – the antithesis of the American ideal of a nation of citizens united in 
their devotion to the welfare of all” (Karnow, 1989, p. 20 as cited in Ileto, 2001, p. 
3). To Karnow’s mind, these are buttressed by Filipino values of hiya and utang na 
                                                        
4
 Mojares (1994) cites Ileto (1984) in defining pulitika as “the perception of politics as a process of bargaining, 
with implicit self or factional interests involved. The interaction between the colonial power and its native 
wards was pulitika. At another level, it refers to the practises by which leaders cultivate ties of personal 
loyalty and indebtedness to them, or simply attract votes.” 
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loob that has created a politics “enmeshed in coils of mutual loyalties” (1989, p. 
230)5.  
 
Karnow’s disclaimer may also have been critical of Ileto when he wrote that the 
Americans could not be blamed for the Philippines’ political failings, since, as 
Ileto would put it, came from “the enduring Philippine value system, and the 
tenacity of the ruling oligarchy” (Ileto, 2001, p. 4).  
 
However, Ileto does not totally blame Karnow for the way he rhetorically crafted 
a ‘juvenile’ Philippine political environment. He unpacks Karnow’s sources, in 
particular Owen and Cullinane (1971), May (1984, 1988, 1997) and McCoy (1980). 
First, Ileto points out that Owen and Cullinane (1971) have essentialised Philippine 
social relationships when they explain that America failed to export its ideals to 
the Philippines because of the dominance of the elites, the compadrazgo6, in 
Philippine politics (2001, p. 6).  
 
Similarly, Ileto’s impression of Karnow was that his text promoted the idea that 
“the Filipino[s]… are doomed from the start (2001, p. 5).” On the other hand, May 
(1984, 1988, 1997) draws attention to pockets in Philippine history, showing that 
“the rank-and-file were just loyal followers to their officers who came from the 
local gentry and were often landlords as well” during the Philippine-American 
War, and that elections in the Philippines is a ‘marionette play’ where elites “pull 
the strings” and their clients “stage performed according to a script” (Ileto, 2001, 
p. 8-9). 
 
As Ileto (2001) states, May would essentialise the ‘nature’ of Filipino politics as 
being personal and particular, operating under patron-client relationships, and 
suffering from “racial deficiency” and “political inexperience” (2001, p. 9-10). On 
the other hand, Ileto adds that McCoy (1980) saw factional loyalties as the 
determining factor ‘essential’ in Philippine politics and as the root cause behind the 
failure of the country’s democratic system (2001, p. 11). As Ileto would elaborate 
to describe McCoy, “the drive to protect, consolidate and or expand factional 
power is the essence of Filipino politics; everything else is empty rhetoric and 
posturing (2001, p. 11).”  
 
                                                        
5
  In Tagalog, “hiya” translates to a sense of shame; “utang na loob” translates to a debt of     
gratitude.  
6
 Editor’s note: “Compadrazgo” can be used to describe a very close and almost familial 
relationship between friends.  
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Ileto (2001) continues to argue that May and McCoy’s view on Philippine political 
history cuts across a far deeper issue in Philippine social science. As far as this 
discussion is concerned, Ileto cites the political models of Lande (1965) and 
McCoy (1994). 
 
To Ileto, Lande seems to say that “Philippine politics is built on the American 
model; it is the politics of the same. But there are key differences and these are 
put in terms of “peculiarities”… (2001, p. 13).” Ileto would interpret that Lande’s 
(1965, 2002) peculiarities—based on ‘empirical’ evidences—have essentialised 
Filipino political behaviour. These include observations that: the two political 
parties (Liberal versus Nacionalista) are really one without any distinguishable 
identity, platform, or program of government; people “fluidly” switch affiliations 
rather than keeping their loyalties to their parties; patron-client relationships is 
equal to disorder where “power is dispersed among local leaders”; and, private 
and public domains are not separate, with private interests infecting the public 
political system (2001, p. 14-15). 
 
Another important work that Ileto criticises is McCoy’s (1994) belief that 
“familism, localism, corruption and violence… essentially underlie Filipino 
political behaviour (2001, p. 21).” An extension to his earlier view that the 
Philippines is mired in factionalism, McCoy insists that political families have 
warped Philippine politics into a period of persistent feudalism, violence, 
warlordism and thuggery, and contrasts it from the ideals of “democracy, 
capitalism, order and the public sphere” of what politics should ideally be (2001, 
p. 21-22). With the presence of political families, McCoy’s language paints 
Philippine politics in a state of “anarchy” (2001, p. 22). 
 
Thus, it is not surprising for Ileto to lament that, indeed, Western scholarship fell 
into the essentialising trap of dichotomising Filipino political relationships into 
‘paired opposites’—“family versus state, particularistic versus nationalistic, 
violence versus law, clientelism versus genuine democracy”—with the West’s 
conclusion that Philippine political behaviour suffers from political 
backwardness (Ileto, 2001, p. 25). 
 
Agreeing with Ileto (2001), Enriquez (1992, 1994), would criticise Western 
scholarship’s way of portraying Filipino behaviour. Enriquez (1992, p. 57), cited 
in Pe-Pua and Protacio-Marcelino (2000), argues that “the native Filipino 
invariably suffers from the comparison in not too subtle attempts to put forward 
Western behaviour patterns as models for the Filipino.” Enriquez (1994) contends 
that the Filipino psyche is cooperative in nature with kapwa (the self embracing 
the other as a unified whole); hence, it is plausible to espouse cooperation. Fine-
tuning cultural lenses towards the “experience, thought and orientation of the 
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Filipinos”, as what has become Enriquez’s (1992) foundation of Filipino 
psychology, would provide a far better perspective in understanding the 
country’s development path. 
 
Rethinking Public Policy 
 
Given this context of the Philippines, students of economics, with a critical eye 
towards the discipline’s underlying philosophy, would readily point out the 
tension between the neoclassical lens prevailing in microeconomic theory and the 
Keynesian prescriptions in macroeconomic theory (Hill and Myatt, 2010). This is 
basically a clash between the core philosophical foundations between Smith 
(1776) and Keynes (1936). 
 
Neoclassical economics trusts that the market will self-correct itself to an 
equilibrium state. However, Keynesian economics distrusts the capability of the 
capitalist market to self-correct; hence, the market warrants government 
intervention. Despite their methodological evolutions into the Rational 
Expectations (New Classical) and New Keynesian schools in macroeconomic 
theory, the conflict has been the same (Snowdon and Vane, 2005). 
 
This is not to say that neoclassical and Keynesian prescriptions are mutually 
exclusive, but in relation to crafting development policies for the Philippines, 
immediately providing prescriptions without a thorough and exhaustive 
diagnosis of real-world problems will only further hinder true development At 
present, macroeconomic policy depicts simple prescriptions such as lowering 
taxes, lowering the budget deficits, increasing government spending, lowering 
the interest rates, lowering the unemployment rates, increasing gross domestic 
product, and increasing investment spending.  
 
Therefore, within the Philippine context, the argument once again is that to make 
macroeconomic policy effective and relevant, one must balance Filipino 
institutions, actrors, processes, and individual behaviour into policy design and 
implementation.. 
 
In fact, Nye (2011b) would argue that the focus not be on grandiose 
macroeconomic visions, but rather on the existing microeconomic distortions 
affecting the political economy, institutions, prices, property rights, the 
bureaucracy, and laws. Particularly, political economy and new institutional 
economics are useful platforms to launch and form effective development 
policies. Within these perspectives, one can apply in the analyses concepts such 
as institutions (North, 1981, 1990, 2005), transactions cost (Coase, 1937, 1960; 
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Williamson, 1985, 2000), and governing common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 
2008).  
 
Rethinking Development as a Whole 
 
From the neoclassical perspective, efficiency, not equity, should be the rule. The 
dogma of these economic principles is a trade-off between efficiency and equity; 
more equity leads to less efficiency; less efficiency leads to wasting scarce 
resources. But in developing economies, like the Philippines with weak 
institutions, equity does not serve as a substitute to efficiency, but serves as a 
necessary requirement at the start of the development process.7  
 
The logic is very straightforward: inequity breeds inequality. This leads to higher 
crime rates and increases in social costs associated with law enforcement, judicial 
processes, and individuals’ efforts to protect themselves and their property (Hill 
and Myatt, 2011). In the process, this actually reduces the allocation of resources 
earmarked for more meaningful uses such as education, healthcare, and social 
services. Hence, distributing the resources for people to receive proper nutrition, 
education, and an institutional environment that promotes an intelligent and 
conscious society can actually supplement efficiency rather than impede it (Hill 
and Myatt, 2010; Jones, 2011). 
 
Neoclassical thinking disregards the importance of social capital in the 
development process. Dayton-Johnson (2001) argued that social cohesion and the 
economic pay-off of trust and cooperation are part of a society’s social capital. 
Equity promotes social cohesion and trust and inequality weakens one’s sense of 
reciprocity. Social capital plays an important role in economic growth. 
 
In contrast, the neoclassical efficiency rule only holds conceptually when society 
views the world under a state of scarcity. In the context of weak institutions, 
however, what exists is not a scarcity of resources, but a scarcity of coordination 
and motivation strategies. The Philippines is resource-rich, with an abundance of 
natural and human resources, but prevailing issues such as poverty, corruption, 
inequality, meagre growth rates, declining industrial and agricultural output, and 
the concentration of power among political and business oligarchs creates the 
development paradox that characterises the country today. 
                                                        
7
 We are now viewing equity of two orders—commutative and distributive. The first form of equity—
commutative equity—is a function of improving the efficiency of people, not on the distribution of resources. 
This simply means providing equitable distribution of absolute needs. It is only when efficiency has been 
established in the production process should the second-order distributive equity take place. 
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Evidence from Knack and Keefer (1997) indicates that greater inequality 
significantly reduces expressed levels of trust. Similarly, Helliwell (2003) found 
that lower levels of trust are associated with lower levels of average individual 
well-being. Additionally, Putnam (1993) noted the benefits of social cohesion that 
leads to more political participation and better government monitoring, resulting 
in greater government efficiency and reduction in corruption. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of these problems facing the Philippines, ironically the way forward may 
actually be to go back. By going back, it is critical to return to the lens of 
economics and assess its plausibility in unpacking social realities. These 
dimensions include power relations within economic exchange (Galbraith, 2004; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009), equity as 
opposed to efficiency in a country’s development (; Hill and Myatt, 2010; Jones, 
2011), and social norms, such as trust, reciprocity, and cooperation (Marglin, 
2008; Marwell and Ames, 1981; Dayton-Johnson, 2001; Frank, Gilovich, and 
Regan, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Heliwell, 2003; Putnam, 1993; Fehr, 2008; 
Zak, 2003; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
Specifically, these factors in the Philippines include the heterogeneity of many 
societies encompassing the Philippine archipelago, the colonial experience of 
many heterogeneous groups, the social identity of being ‘Filipino’, and the 
common social impulses in history. These are important factors essential in 
designing a reflective analysis in Filipino experience that may be important in 
understanding the nature and state of its institutions and eventually, that would 
allow it to develop effective policies that truly responds to the needs of the 
country. 
 
As argued in this paper, an out-of-touch perspective fails to put the Philippines 
into the proper perspective. What stands as a continuing problem is not the 
scarcity of resources, but rather the idleness of resources, and the failure of 
institutions to coordinate in the process. It is incorrect to classify the blame of 
institutional breakdown to either government or market failure alone. 
 
Furthermore, the country’s policymakers must not succumb to merely providing 
antidotes without a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of its 
problems. They should not even think of accepting any development framework 
unless it extracts, explicates, and integrates the economic, political, social, and 
psychological variables of Philippine society into its perspective. Although this is 
very elementary, the synergistic and contextual appreciation of both theory and 
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reality is where the government can develop effective policies. However, these 
interdisciplinary interactions are oftentimes absent in public policy discussions. 
 
Therefore, what is urgently needed is a development framework that 
encompasses all the economic, political and social factors affecting the 
Philippines. We see the prospect of looking at the Philippines through the lens of 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) because this emerging discipline provides the 
foundation for economics and social sciences to start reconciling various 
theoretical differences. Hopefully, this field, as envisioned by North, Wallis and 
Weingast (2009), can produce a unifying conceptual framework that could make 
sense of the interlacing problems affecting the development experience of the 
Philippines. 
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A BATTLE FOR VALUES:  
HONG KONG AND ITS CONSTITUTIONS 
 
Yinxuan Huang1 & Patrick Overeem2 
 
 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law has caused a number of long-lasting disputes about 
democracy in Hong Kong and in recent political reform debates. These debates 
have provided rich sources of reflections on freedom, democracy, and the rule of 
law. The clash between pro-democrats and the pro-Beijing camp is thus not 
only about political interests, but also presents a confrontation of differing 
ethics and values. This article attempts to explore the values derived from the 
Basic Law in line with John Rohr’s concept of regime values. It demonstrates 
the different regime values that exist in Hong Kong and presents them 
particularly as a freedom-loyalty trade-off. It also argues that bureaucrats and 
judges are essential in establishing and balancing these prominent regime 
values and seem decisive for constitutional developments in the relationship 
between Hong Kong and Mainland China in the future. 
 
Introduction  
 
On 1 July 1997, the governance and supervision of Hong Kong was transferred 
from Great Britain to China. It is now known as one of the Special 
Administrative Regions (SAR) under the communist regime. Its administrative 
status is determined by the official “One Country, Two Systems” policy. Many 
incidents shed light on Hong Kong’s tortuous progress towards a more 
developed democracy (Zhang 2010, 444). Since the hand-over in 1997, voices 
calling for changes and progress in the politics of Hong Kong have not vanished 
and major political issues have continuously tested the nerve of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC). These incidents, from the traditional 1 July marches for 
expansion of civil liberties to the recent Five Constituencies Referendum for 
universal suffrage, present a problematic situation in Hong Kong’s 
contemporary political society. The process of democratisation is characterised 
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by ‘institutions, pacts and bargains stuck between the authorised leaders and the 
pro-democratic oppositions’ (Zhang 2010, 445; Grugel 2002, 57). 
 
Interestingly, a number of controversies in Hong Kong are tightly linked with 
the region’s Basic Law. As a by-product of the “One Country, Two Systems” 
policy, Hong Kong is not completely bound to the Constitution of China. During 
1985 and 1989, a committee consisting of members from both Hong Kong and 
China drafted a “mini-constitution” for Hong Kong. The National People’s 
Congress of China formally promulgated the final product, the Hong Kong Basic 
Law, on 4 April 1990. At the 1997 handover the Basic Law was expected to be a 
guide to the citizens and bureaucrats in Hong Kong. However, as a young 
constitution, with many of its central provisions still to be fully interpreted by 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), the Basic 
Law developed in unexpected ways (Scott 2005, 30). Poon argues that Beijing 
needed such ‘constructive vagueness’ to woo the hearts and minds of Hong 
Kong people and stabilise society (Poon 2008, 41). Hence, the Basic Law itself is 
far from perfect according to the pro-democrats in Hong Kong. In the past 
decade, the Basic Law has dramatically become a ‘problem-creator’; it is 
connected with almost every controversial political issue in this SAR. There were 
deep and highly visible disagreements on the interpretations of various articles 
in the Basic Law in a number of disputed issues such as government 
accountability and the introduction of universal suffrage. For all its 
shortcomings, the Basic Law has a strong influence on bureaucrats in Hong 
Kong and is discussed by judges and scholars on a regular basis. As Thynne 
remarks, the Basic Law creates “a framework within which understandings, 
relationships, various causes actions, and so on, will have to be forged, justified 
and maintained through on-going processes of political debates and 
manoeuvring” (Thynne 1998, 238).  
 
So the question arises: why is the Basic Law creating problems? Sing argues that 
Hong Kong’s political development has lagged in the face of PRC’s efforts to 
impede progress towards direct elections, universal suffrage, and other 
democratising reforms that Beijing fears might loosen its control (Sing 2009, 98). 
This argument, to some extent, presents the mainstream view on the cause of the 
constitutional problems. According to this view, different understandings of 
some key articles in the Basic Law have formed the basis of controversies 
between Beijing and Hong Kong. Throughout the past decade, Beijing has been 
trying to defend its authority in explaining the constitution, while the pro-
democracy camp has been taking such political actions as to force the Beijing 
government to make compromises in the implementation of the Basic Law. 
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Furthermore, recent incidents in Hong Kong show that both sides have sought 
to resolve short-term political controversies related to the Basic Law rather than 
articulate long-term constitutional review. However, should public institutions 
and political reforms be considered as the only subject of a constitutional 
debate? The drawback of this type of explanation is that it focuses on only one 
part of the matrix and neglects the fundamental legal-constitutional nature of 
the problems. In other words, the ‘mainstream’ explanation merely focuses on 
various types of conflicts of interests presented in the confrontation between the 
central government and pro-democrats, yet continues to neglect other important 
elements upon which the post-1997 Hong Kong regime was built. Indeed, the 
Basic Law does not only confine itself to a short statement of constitutional 
principles, but also creates changes in public institutions, civil services and 
relations with Beijing (Chan 2003; Dykes 2010, 418; Holiday and Wong 2003; 
Huque and Yep 2003). Hence, the influence of the Basic Law entails more than 
bargaining on a narrow political ground. Much of this influence is presented in 
the so-called constitutional values, which are beyond political games.  
 
An Alternative Concept 
 
The definition of constitutional values used here is wider than its dictionary 
meaning, namely a system of laws and principles according to which a country 
is governed. It draws on the broader conceptualisation of constitutional values 
as in terms of the American public administration scholar Rohr’s regime values. 
He presented this concept for the first time in a 1976 article and then gave it a 
prominent place in his book Ethics for Bureaucrats (Rohr 1976; 1989). His basic 
argument is that an orientation towards regime values can help bureaucrats and 
possibly other public officials to choose their path when the law gives no 
guidance, requiring their own discretion. . In his view, administrative discretion 
is the most appropriate starting point for the study of administrative ethics 
(Rohr 1989, 23). He presents his concept of regime values in the context of a 
discussion reagrding the best way to teach administrative ethics, as a “practical 
teaching device” for “busy bureaucrats” (Rohr 1989, 77) or, in the earlier version, 
“career-oriented students” (Rohr 1976, 402). Writing in the American context, he 
notes the republican commitments of civil servants, symbolised by their oath of 
office: “The oath to uphold the Constitution is the moral foundation of ethics for 
bureaucrats” (Rohr 1989, 70). 
 
Although not the highest values a regime might aspire to, constitutional values 
are the values every official within a regime must promote. Rohr elaborates on 
the meaning of ‘regime’ as follows: “The word ‘regime’ is not used in the 
journalistic sense of the ‘Carter regime,’ the ‘Reagan regime’ (Rohr 1989, 3). 
Rather it is simply intended as the best English equivalent of what Aristotle 
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meant by a ‘polity’. More specifically by the American ‘regime,’ I mean the 
fundamental political order established by the Constitution of 1789”. According 
to this interpretation of ‘regime’ it is in fact a relatively broad concept of political 
tradition and culture, rather than a narrowly legal concept. The second concept 
of values Rohr (Rohr 1989, 74) defines as follows: “By ‘values’ I mean beliefs, 
passions, and principles that have been held for several generations by the 
overwhelming majority of the American people”. Taken together, regime values 
in his studies are “the values of that political entity that were brought into being 
by the ratification of the constitution that created the present American republic” 
(Rohr 1989, 74). In Ethics for Bureaucrats, Rohr engages in extensive discussions 
on three prominent examples of American regime values in particular, namely 
equality, freedom, and property (Rohr 1989, 97-279). 
 
Framed more generally and not only for the American context, regime values 
have a subtle but significant impact on bureaucratic decision making. Their 
decision-making is tightly connected with their subjective choice and ethics. In 
the meantime, their responsibility to uphold the regime values in line with the 
constitution objectively limits the flexibility of bureaucrats in their decision-
making practices. Thus, regime values have considerable effects on decision 
making within the bureaucracy of a particular regime; the values of that regime 
are a proper starting point for their ethical reflections. To be sure, the ethics that 
affect how public officials make their choices might consist of different types of 
regime values, depending on the particular regime. In any case, decision-makers 
should ask themselves whether or not their decisions are constitutionally 
appropriate. 
 
The bulk of Rohr’s research is based on the political context and the Constitution 
of the United States, but the concept of regime values can be applied to other 
states as well. The normative foundation of ethical standards for public servants 
in any regime is formed by the values of that regime. Rohr puts forth two points: 
on the one hand, all regimes have regime values, so the concept of regime values 
is general; on the other hand, each regime has its own regime values, so regime 
values themselves are particular(istic). Consequently, in his studies, Rohr (Rohr 
1990; 2002; 2004) also researched constitutional values in other public 
administrative states such as France, the UK, and Thailand. It is interesting to 
investigate the prominent values of public administrators in the current political 
context of Hong Kong so as to examine the ‘purity’ or independence of that 
regime. Do these values present a clear divergence from the Chinese Communist 
regime? Or are the two regimes entwined with each other? Indeed, it is essential 
to explore the background in political thinking and value orientation behind the 
Basic Law. Researching the constitutional values promoted by the Basic Law and 
the way bureaucrats in Hong Kong cope with competing constitutional values is 
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likely to create several meaningful outcomes. Regime values, perceived as 
ethical values for public officials, could provide us with deeper causes of the 
conflicts in Hong Kong – not only fights over short-term political interests, but 
diverging value commitments. More positively, this viewpoint could help us to 
go beyond the different interpretations of the Basic Law by providing a shared 
ethical guidance for bureaucrats among different political camps in Hong Kong. 
Like the ‘American values’ discussed by Rohr, prominent regime values derived 
from the Basic Law might thus become a pillar upon which a unifying set of 
‘Hong Kong values’ can be established. 
 
The Old Motherland, the British Empire, and the Child Born in 1997 
 
Discovering regime values in Hong Kong is no easy task because there are three 
cultures that have influenced politics in Hong Kong, namely British, Chinese- 
communist, and Confucian. Shortly after the First Opium War, Hong Kong 
Island was formally ceded to Britain under the Treaty of Nanking, 1842. In the 
next 155 years, politics in Hong Kong was deeply influenced by the governance 
of Britain and  followed the English Common Law tradition despite a four-year 
occupation by Japan during the Second World War. The colonial constitution 
was largely unwritten and legal authorities stemmed from the Royal 
Instructions and the Letters Patent, some of which were not binding (Scott 2005, 
30). In colonial times, Hong Kong could be administered relatively easily with its 
small size and population and monolithic bureaucratic structure (Huque and 
Yep 2003, 142). Hong Kong’s hand-over in 1997 introduced a new type of regime 
to all the people in the region. For the first time in its history, the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) was able to play a decisive role in Hong Kong. 
Notwithstanding the space offered by the “One Country, Two Systems” policy, 
the communist government never promised absolute freedom to the SAR 
government. As is stated in the Basic Law, the expected age of the “One 
Country, Two Systems” policy is 50 years and it is unlikely that Beijing will stop 
its effort of merging the two systems together after 2047. As Scott remarks, "the 
drafters of the Basic Law sought to create a centralized and autocratic system 
that would enable the political executive to make policy and to ensure that their 
institutions were implemented" (Scott 2005, 47).  Lastly, next to the colonial and 
communist influences, like in most of the other states in East Asia, Confucianism 
has been a major hallmark of China’s culture. More importantly, both Mainland 
Chinese and Hong Kong scholars have been trying to discover the linkage 
between traditional Confucianism and modern constitutional democracy (Chan 
2003; Jiang 2008). 
 
The combined cultural background of Hong Kong’s Basic Law is decidedly more 
complex than that of the US Constitution. Debates on the US Constitution, such 
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as those between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, still evolved under the 
same legal-philosophical umbrella. By contrast, the establishment of Hong 
Kong’s Basic Law took place against a background of British common law 
thinking, Marxist-Leninist theories, and Confucian values. This mixed 
background is reflected in the political value gap between pro-democrats and 
pro-Chinese in Hong Kong and their different concepts of nation building. The 
constitutional conflicts in Hong Kong, very much like the constitutional debates 
in America in the 18th Century, provide us with rich sources in discovering the 
core values that the new regime has been pursuing.  
 
After 1997, organising and harmonising the various values derived from the 
complex history of Hong Kong has become an uneasy task. In the US, the 
Supreme Court is authorised to rule on the constitutional legitimacy of 
legislation, which since Marbury v. Madison has become an outstanding element 
in the checks and balances system. Compared to the US, the current 
constitutional order in Hong Kong is rather unclear. As in China, there is no 
‘Supreme Court’ in Hong Kong to interpret the Basic Law or provide judicial 
reviews. Under Article 158, the courts in Hong Kong have the final word in the 
interpretation of the Basic Law, yet subject only to a power of final interpretation 
reserved to a Mainland authority, namely the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC). Because Hong Kong is not a sovereign state, the 
courts in Hong Kong (including the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) which is 
comparable to the US Supreme Court) have limited jurisdiction.  
 
Regime Values in the Basic Law: the Freedom-Loyalty Trade-off 
 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law has received criticism ever since its inception. 
Nevertheless, the literal definition of the “One Country, Two Systems” does 
convey CPC’s willingness to allow a non-Marxist government in Hong Kong (as 
well as in Macau and Taiwan, China’s other SARs). This willingness, whether 
simulated or real, is present in most of the general principles under the Basic 
Law. 
 
One of the most frequently used words in the Basic Law is freedom. This 
principle, including freedom of speech, religion and press, freedom of assembly 
and association and freedom to strike, is omnipresent in Articles 27-38.  
Furthermore, Articles 2 and 8, for example, enable Hong Kong to keep its 
administrative status and common-law system as it was before 1997. More 
importantly, the possibility to retain the political order and citizens’ rights in 
Hong Kong represents the freedom principle as a large part of the “Two 
Systems” idea. If one word can be used to describe the constitutional values 
expressed in the Basic Law, it would be freedom. Of course, we should not be 
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shocked if this argument is criticised or despised by many citizens, especially 
pro-democrats in Hong Kong. The conflicts discussed in previous sections 
indicate that the current reality seems to dramatically fall short of the 
constitutional ideal. In recent political movements against some of Beijing’s 
decisions in Hong Kong, the largest voice in these incidents was indeed that 
asking for freedom. A number of movements such as the traditional 1 July 
marches had set freedom as a major theme. Although Beijing officially advocates 
Hong Kong’s relative independence, this attitude has seldom been 
acknowledged by the pro-democrats during much of the post-1997 era. As 
mentioned before, both sides find it hard to reach an agreement on the 
interpretation of some key articles in the Basic Law.  
 
Loyalty is the second prominent regime value in the Basic Law after freedom. 
While freedom is the symbol of “Two Systems”, loyalty is the symbol of “One 
Country”. Article 158 in the Basic Law provides the framework of the 
relationship between the central government and Hong Kong government. 
Despite their adjudication power, the CFA’s and lower courts’ decisions will be 
bound by the interpretation of the NPCSC in sovereignty-related issues. Thus 
far, the Hong Kong government has sought the NPCSC to interpret the Basic 
Law twice (in 1999 on the right of abode and in 2005 on the tenure term of Chief 
Executive), and the NPCSC itself has taken the initiative to interpret the Basic 
Law on the question of universal suffrage in 2004. In all three cases, the pro-
democratic alliance tried to ask for more freedom and independence but failed 
to succeed due to the resistance from Beijing. In a number of occasions, 
politicians in Beijing have also consistently expressed the importance of 
understanding ‘One Country’ as the premise for ‘Two Systems’. In this case, 
considering that the final opinions given by the Hong Kong government were all 
in line with relevant provisions from the NPCSC according to Article 158, 
loyalty has become a systematic premise for freedom. Notwithstanding many 
voices against the post-1997 political system, officials who hold positions in the 
government are still upholding the Basic Law. In the Prem Singh vs. Director of 
Immigration case, 2003, CFA Chief Justice Andrew Li stated in his judgment that:  
 
“In any event, the position is simply this. The courts have to uphold the Basic 
Law no matter how anybody may react to our doing so. No other course is open 
to us. Upholding the Basic Law is the first thing that every member of Hong 
Kong's judiciary swears to do when he or she takes the judicial oath”.  
 
Li’s words suggest that judges (and also bureaucrats) in Hong Kong should not 
offend the basic principles in the mini-constitution, even if they would consider 
certain articles illegitimate. In June 2009, President of National People's Congress 
Wu Bangguo issued an important speech on Hong Kong’s political reform. He 
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stated that Hong Kong’s autonomy was granted by the central government, 
including the power of Hong Kong government, but he emphasised that there 
was no ‘residual power’ for Hong Kong to decide its political future (Mingpao 
2009; Zhang 2010, 448). 
 
Evidence of loyalty is also presented in cases of political appointments. As was 
implied by the former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, only “patriots” who 
“respect the nation, supporting the motherland’s sovereignty over Hong Kong 
whole-heartedly and doing no harm to Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability” 
would be allowed to rule Hong Kong (Deng 1984; Poon 2008, 29). The first Chief 
Executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-Hwa, is perhaps one of these reliable 
loyalists to the central government. When explaining the reason that Tung was 
appointed, Qian Qichen, Vice Premier and Chairman of the Preparation 
Committee, mentioned nothing about the Chief Executive being able to gain a 
mandate from the people whom he was supposed to present, but emphasised 
Tung's comprehensive understanding in "One country, Two systems" (Poon 
2008, 29). Apparently, Tung and Beijing shared common plans on the future of 
Hong Kong; the former was agreeable to subordination to the latter. During 
Tung’s tenure, both he and the Chinese government wanted a new order that 
asserted political control over civil service and tried to bring to government 
what his administration regarded as the benefits of private sector practices (Scott 
2005, 376).  
 
Ideally, Beijing expects to become the ideological foundation and driving force 
for Hong Kong’s bureaucrats within the context of the Basic Law. National 
interests would precede local interests should any conflict emerge between the 
mainland and Hong Kong (Poon 2008, 28). Hence, this “patriotic approach” 
challenges the pro-democracy alliance that so often provokes their constitutional 
authority in Beijing. Interestingly, according to this context, freedom is presented 
as bounded freedom. Unlike the regime values in the US, bounded values are not 
only derived from one constitution. Rather, they are a type of value that is first 
stated in the Basic Law and then re-interpreted by the NPCSC.  
Although Article 45 of the Basic Law stipulates eventual universal suffrage to 
choose Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, the exact schedule for implementation is 
still unclear. The CPC has indicated that 2017 and 2020 would be the right time, 
while pro-democrats have urged Hong Kong’s government to allow 
referendums in 2007, 2008, or 2012. Recently, the Article 45 Concern Group 
requested the implementation of the promised direct elections for the Chief 
Executive as stipulated in Article 45 and has become an extremely significant 
part for the pro-democracy alliance (Poon 2008, 74-5). In April 2004, despite 
pressures from the pro-democracy alliance, the NPCSC ruled against the 
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introduction of universal suffrage before 2017. Central Government Liaison 
Office in Hong Kong deputy director Li Gang commented:  
 
“The move [advocating a referendum] is against the Basic Law. They [the 
politicians] are playing with fire (...). They just want to use this practice to 
overrule the decision made by the National Peoples’ Congress Standing 
Committee” (Ng 2004). 
 
Li suggested that in principle there is no absolute freedom in Hong Kong politics 
when it comes to the interaction between CPC and opposing parties. The 
contradicting opinions of pro-democrats and officials such as Li reveal a loyalty-
freedom trade-off. On one hand, there is a completely independent judiciary for 
Hong Kong’s ‘domestic’ issues, but on the other, an independent judiciary does 
not exist in cases connected to the ‘One Country’ principle.  
 
Unfortunately, the bounded values in Hong Kong do not yet seem to provide 
the type of ethical guidance to public officials envisioned by Rohr in the 
American context. On the contrary, the bargain on Basic Law articles between 
the pro-democracy camp and the pro-Beijing camp shows that the Basic Law is 
likely to create more confusion in the contemporary Hong Kong political society. 
The constitutional debates on elections and other issues, like those in the 
transitional period, can be seen as a means of defending civil liberties against 
encroachments by the Beijing government (Scott 2010, 37). Therefore, the 
perception of constitutional democracy in Hong Kong varies between the major 
camps. This has already caused heated debates and is likely to continue to be a 
highlighted topic in this region in the future. 
 
Rule of Law and the Last Fortress 
 
Although Hong Kong is still a relatively free society compared with Mainland 
China, it is by no means as free as it was before. The loyalty-freedom trade-off 
has resulted in a confusing definition of freedom in Hong Kong. This is also the 
main reason that pro-democrats started a heated debate with the pro-Beijing 
camp after 1997. They have been calling not only for basic human rights, but also 
for a more independent and more democratic political system with little 
interference from the central government – both of course unacceptable to the 
government in Beijing. These efforts to loosen the bounds of freedom were 
apparent in major incidents in the past decade, from the 2004 referendum 
proposal to the Five Constituencies Referendum in 2010. A more important 
point is that the pro-democracy camp leaders as well as CPC officials expect 
courts and judges in Hong Kong to play an essential role in promoting certain 
types of freedom. There is also concern that the Hong Kong government might 
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not be able to uphold the rule of law when there are strong political forces 
opposing it and if there is pressure from the Chinese Government (Tai 2007). 
The discussion above highlights the NPCSC interpretation (and curtailment) of 
freedom via the CFA in the previous section. However, pro-democrats are also 
hoping that judges in the post-1997 era can continue to uphold their deep-rooted 
ethical values from the colonial period. Democratic Party legislator Emily Lau 
made a speech at the meeting of the Legislative Council on 9 June 2010, 
indicating the importance of the CFA for the protection of freedom in Hong 
Kong:   
 
“The judiciary is often regarded as the last fortress of a free society, upholding 
universal core values such as personal liberty, freedom of expression and freedom 
of assembly. (...) As the head of the judiciary, the Chief Justice plays a pivotal role 
in defending the valuable attributes of a free society. Thus, he must have high 
integrity, independence and the courage to defend his own convictions” (Lau 
2010). 
 
In 2005, the Court of Final Appeal unanimously overturned the convictions of 
eight Falun Gong members for assaulting and obstructing the police in a case 
that was widely seen as a test of the judicial independence and the right to 
protest in Hong Kong. Officially designated as a dangerous ‘cult’, the Falun 
Gong has become one of the biggest groups opposing the CPC. It was to some 
extent a challenge to CFA judges since they were supposed to clarify their stance 
in the debate on freedom. Finally, in a summary of the verdict, the CFA 
elaborated that the freedom to demonstrate peacefully is protected by the Basic 
Law:  
 
“Those freedoms are at the heart of Hong Kong’s system and the courts should 
give them a generous interpretation. (…) The demonstrators were engaged in a 
peaceful demonstration in exercise of their constitutional right and (…) their 
right to protest should have been taken into consideration before they were 
arrested” (Wong 2005). 
 
Although this opinion was welcomed by pro-democrats, some political 
commentators have indicated an ironical aspect of it. They have pointed to the 
fact that, while demonstration against the British Crown and British colonial rule 
was punishable by imprisonment in Hong Kong under colonial rule, criticism of 
China and its socialist system is now celebrated as a defence of democratic 
freedom in post-colonial Hong Kong (Liu 2005). Despite the desire to provide a 
generous interpretation in order to grant the public request for freedom, CFA 
cannot hide from its own loyalty to the Basic Law. There exists little confidence 
in the current political process, which reflects the enthusiasm for a constitutional 
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review among the public (Dykes 2010, 418). For CFA and other courts in Hong 
Kong, judicial review may decide to what extent freedom in Hong Kong is 
bounded and still how far it is from pro-democracy ideals.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Rohr presented his concept of regimes values as important for administrators to 
promote when they have to make discretionary decisions reflecting a normative 
ethical concept. In Hong Kong, however, constitutional values like freedom are 
used more as political criteria to test whether bureaucrats from a certain camp 
actually promote the values of that camp in the new regime. Compared to the 
US Supreme Court, the CFA and other courts in Hong Kong tend to decide cases 
on narrower legalistic grounds rather than broad regime values and principles. 
Restricted by their political limitations, they are not in a position to articulate 
regime values. Another problem is that constitutional values are certainly not 
the only or perhaps even the highest kind of values bureaucrats have to 
promote. Waldo argues bureaucrats find themselves mired in multiple, and 
often conflicting, obligations. Apart from the regime or Constitution, Waldo also 
lists the law, the nation or the country, democracy, organisational or 
bureaucratic norms, their profession, family and friends, the public interest or 
general welfare, humanity or the world, and religion as sources of conflicting 
obligations (Waldo 1980, 103-106). In constitutional debates in Hong Kong, 
much of the focus is on striving for certain political interests rather than 
articulating constitutional values. 
 
Nevertheless, we cannot simply declare that Hong Kong or China is without 
constitutional values. Much of the establishment of American regime values is 
related to the intent of the framers. Federal judges in the US, when interpreting 
the Constitution, frequently use the Federalist papers as a contemporary account 
of the intentions of the framers and of the ratifying citizenry (Lupu 1998, 403-
410). A widespread classical debate similar to that between the Federalists and 
the Anti-Federalists and references to such documents does not exist in China at 
this moment. A primary source like the Federalist Papers is difficult to set up in 
Hong Kong considering the complexity of its politics, but recent debates have at 
least produced an embryo of the constitutional values in this particular region. 
The constitutional clash between the two major camps did not only provide 
Hong Kong with a certain level of political and bureaucratic crisis, but also 
offered an opportunity for bureaucrats and scholars to re-define their values and 
find a better way to improve the nation building of China as a whole. Aiming to 
shape the future interpretation of the Basic Law, Beijing and Hong Kong have 
played a constitutional game of interpretation and re-interpretation since 1997. 
A positive result of this game could be that both sides compromise over some 
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controversial interpretations of the principles in the Basic Law. As for the other 
extreme, the game might also end up in non-stop debates, even conflict, and 
bureaucrats may use their ‘personally articulated’ administrative discretion in 
line with narrow political interests. Therefore, the situation in Hong Kong may 
come to a deadlock, or even deteriorate, and there will be no ground for 
establishing shared normative regime values.  
 
So who will be the crucial players in the game? There is no doubt that the three 
permanent judges in the CFA, as Emily Lau argued, are some of the most critical 
individuals. Judicial independence ensures that the Hong Kong government 
cannot control the decisions of the CFA and the ‘two systems’ policy ensures the 
officials in the NPCSC do not monitor them. This may explain why judicial 
opinions given by the CFA have caused displeasure from Beijing. Practically and 
principally, judges have more autonomy than other bureaucrats and are more 
likely to push the game in a specific direction. Hence, the ethics and ideologies 
of those judges will be decisive for the future of the Basic Law because these 
dimensions shape their behaviour and actions in their interaction with the ruling 
citizens in Hong Kong and China. 
However, as we have suggested before, regime values might not be the only 
variable. Interestingly enough, bureaucrats in Hong Kong have experienced a 
big change in political and social values in the past few decades. Before 1997, 
they needed to learn that British law was sovereign; after 1997, the Basic Law 
outlined new values. Apart from the two constitutions, they inevitably had to 
learn of Beijing’s ideologies and adjust that to their own discretionary judgment. 
Finally, the Confucian elements in the Hong Kong political society can also affect 
the Chinese judges in courts. Their own perceptions on loyalty and freedom, 
good governance and bureaucracy, and democracy and communism will shape 
the interpretations of constitutional values in China, which remain unsettled. 
Predictably, efforts made by Hong Kong and Beijing might not produce major 
results in a short period of time. Moreover, with its so-called ‘constructive 
vagueness’, the Basic Law itself may become the cracks in the wall of Hong 
Kong’s last fortress.  
 
On 31 August 2010, the much respected Chief Justice of the CFA, Andrew Li, 
resigned. His successor Geoffrey Ma and other ruling citizens in China and 
Hong Kong must continue to work towards judicial progress. Last but not least, 
changes in Hong Kong politics may also shape the future of the loyalty-freedom 
trade-off. In May 2010, Li Gang, on behalf of CPC, had a constructive 
conversation with the opposition democrats, which was considered to be a 
milestone in Hong Kong’s democratic development. Delegates of pro-democrats 
eventually persuaded Beijing to accept their reform proposal. In July the 
televised debate between Donald Tsang and Audrey Eu on political reform also 
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highlighted the importance of democracy and freedom in Hong Kong politics in 
the next decade. It is unclear at this moment whether or not these promising 
events will finally lead to improved interpretations of ‘freedom’ and other 
possible regime values of Hong Kong. But as this article has shown, these values 
do provide us with the means to reveal the long-neglected ethical and moral 
elements underlying Hong Kong’s constitutional battles.  
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REFORMING CHINA’S WATER LAW THROUGH REFORMS OF THE DIVISION 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND DELEGATE POWERS 
 
Larissa Paschyn1  
 
Statutory and case law at the provincial and local level provides critical legal 
frameworks for water management in China. As many provincial and local 
governments struggle to improve efficiency in water management and resolve 
conflicts over water usage, they must continually assess the efficacy of their 
national and local water laws and regulating bodies. China’s water laws have 
undergone reforms but are still disconnected and overlapping. This paper 
assesses China’s state water law. It takes first steps toward a comprehensive 
state water resources act by setting out an analytical framework for a reform 
process. The methodology of the paper focuses on issues and conflicts in water 
management at the state, and local level.  It amalgamates management and 
legal analyses that incorporate the diverse perspectives of state water 
stakeholders. The results are identification of management issues, profiles of 
provincial water laws and regulating bodies, and explorations of legal reforms 
that are available to the national government.  
 
Introduction 
 
In 1988, China enacted a national Water Law. This brought important institutions 
to clarify water use rights and improve overall water management, including 
water withdrawal permit system, water fee and water resource fees (Ongley and 
Wang 2004, 2). The water withdrawal permit system empowers the State to issue 
permits for all water drawn directly from aquifers, rivers, or lakes (China Council 
for International Cooperation on Economic Development Secretariat (CCICED) 
Task Force, 2004).  
 
The Water Law (1988) prescribed runoff allocation schemes for Trans-boundary 
Rivers. The allocation scheme divided water rights among different riparian 
administrative districts. These districts were usually provinces, and were given 
upper limits on drawing river runoff (Wang 2006, 3). However, this allocation 
scheme generally was not implemented because the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MWR) and the provincial governments neglected to create enforcement 
institutions.  Moreover, river basin organisations (RBOs) lacked sufficient 
                                                        
1
 Larissa Paschyn is a graduate student at Tsinghua University School of Public Policy and Management. 
Paschyn can be contacted at Larissa.Paschyn@gmail.com 
 
  
 
 
70 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS VOL. 5. NO. 1 
political clout and the ability to coordinate amongst the provinces (Chen 2008, 
218).  
In 2002, China amended the Water Law to promote a more integrated legal system 
of water management.  The legislation gave RBOs greater power to enforce a new 
institution of unified water diversion. River water is now allocated by the 
requirements of water districts and in-stream ecological needs (Wang 2003a, 94). 
In 1998, the State Council also revised the Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China on Administration of Water Transport (1987). The 1987 decree held the 
Ministry of Communications as the department responsible for water transport 
throughout the country. Local departments for communications were also 
responsible for the water transport in their respective regions, and could set up 
administrative agencies for water transport. The revision instead authorized the 
Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) to unify the diversion of water. 
However, the YRCC, the strongest RBO, has struggled to ration water allocation 
in the Basin, and weaker RBOs have faced even more difficulties in implementing 
a runoff allocation scheme (Wang 2003b, 7).  
Current Laws and Context 
 
A water withdrawal permit system has been set up in most of China’s 
watersheds.  It has divided water use rights among factories and individual 
users.  However there is ineffective enforcement (CCICED Task Force, 2004). It is 
difficult for local water resource bureaus and RBOs to monitor all the users due 
to challenges of information asymmetry. Moreover, local governments do not 
always grant water agencies sufficient administrative power. The RBOs are 
chaired by nominal committees without members, and enforcing a unified water 
diversion system is difficult to coordinate for all water districts as there is no 
public participation or stakeholder involvement.  RBOs also lack the financial 
means and man-power to implement, monitor, and enforce allocation schemes. 
This is because water conservation is viewed as a burden hindering economic 
development (CCICED Task Force, 2004).  
 
Since the total amount control of regional water is not enforced by the provincial 
level water agencies, local water resource bureaus have little incentive to monitor 
water withdrawals of users (Wang 2006, 11). In some areas, regulators abuse their 
authority and are involved in corruptive practices such as illegal water use or 
bribes and even allow users to draw water in excess of their permit in return for a 
water resource fee from them. These overdrafts essentially steal water already 
allocated to other users. They are also a major source of interregional water 
conflicts in China (Wang 2003b, 7). Due to poor legislation and delineation of 
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ministerial duties, policymakers face numerous challenges in creating sustainable 
policies in respect of water management.  
 
Water quantity management falls under the jurisdiction of the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and The Ministry of Water 
Resources (MWR) (Wang 2003b, 9). Under the Chinese legal system, SEPA is 
empowered under the Environmental Protection Control Act (1979) and the Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law (WPPC, enacted in 1984 and revised in 1996) 
to regulate water pollution. Yet, inconsistent stipulations in the WPPC (1996) and 
Water Law (2002) have resulted in inter-ministerial conflicts between SEPA and 
MWR.  Much of the conflict revolves around who has the “power” or who is in 
charge of what projects (i.e. water quality protection or water quality planning), 
as well as competition over “turf” control such as testing sites, and station 
locations. This affects the implementation of water quality planning, protection 
and monitoring (Ongley and Wang 2004, 4). 
  
The WPPC (1996) further stipulates that SEPA develop water quality planning 
according to national and basin-level targets (Wang 2003b, 6). All operational 
responsibilities for pollution control plans are delegated downwards to 
Provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs).  The EPBs take direction 
from SEPA, but are mainly responsible to fulfilling demands by the provincial 
governments (Wang 2003b, 7). Therefore, we can see that he central faults in 
China’s current water quantity management regime are ineffective enforcement 
of legal institutions and in undefined administrative laws.  
 
The Water Quality Management Regime  
 
Whereas the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) is the main organ of State 
Council to control water quantity management (as stated above), water quality is 
overseen jointly by SEPA and MWR (Wang 2007, 403). The Water Law (2002) 
authorizes MWR to oversee “water resource” management. Yet “water resource” 
lacks a clear legal definition in the statute. Thus, the MWR has regarded water 
quality protection also as one of its responsibilities. This has caused contentious 
administrative struggle between SEPA and MWR.  There is little sharing of data 
or collaborative analysis of data, and there is no shared database of quantitative 
and qualitative monitoring results.  They also do not have a common set or 
standard of monitoring parameters to gauge measurements to, and frequently 
compete for assignment of station and sampling locations (Wang 2007, 403). This 
compromises any analytical value of current water quality databases for China.   
 
As mentioned above, the WPPC (1996) also stipulates that SEPA develop water 
quality planning according to national and basin-level targets. Operational 
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responsibilities of pollution control plans are delegated to the EPBs.  These EPBs 
are run by SEPA (Ongley and Wang 2004, 6).  The EPBs are responsible for 
fulfilling demands by the provincial governments. These water quality plans are 
more bureaucratic than scientific. Thus, water quality targets tend to be quite 
unrealistic in practice, and have not, on the whole, been realized (Ongley and 
Wang 2004, 7).  
 
The Water Law (2002) also authorizes MWR to develop water resources protection 
planning. The aim is to establish water function zones, estimate pollution 
assimilation capacity of waterways, and propose pollution loading targets (Wang 
2003a, 96).  However, SEPA has, instead, developed its own estimates of 
assimilation capacity and loading targets. This is because of the ambiguities 
between the WPPC and Water Law (2002).  These have created conflicting 
mandates for pollution control and water resources management (Ongley and 
Wang 2004, 6). Moreover, this undefined administrative legal framework has 
resulted in the absence of an integrated basin-level water resource system. It also 
has resulted in a lack of pollution control planning and management (World 
Bank 2001, 122). 
 
China’s seven major river basins are managed by RBOs. They have broad 
responsibilities to manage water quantity issues (World Bank 2001, 122). RBOs 
are subordinate organisations under the MWR.  They have no formal 
responsibility to implement pollution plans issued by SEPA. In 1980, to create 
stronger basin-wide water quality management of these major rivers, the central 
government mandated the creation of the Water Resource Protection Bureaus 
(WRPBs) within the RBOs (Wang 2006, 9).  
 
The WRPB is jointly run by the MWR and SEPA. It is responsible for gathering 
water quality data and reporting to both ministries. However, since 1998, SEPA 
has been attempting to set up its own monitoring network. It has even proposed 
to set up its own river basin organisation (Wang 2006, 9). The State Council has 
rejected this proposal. Furthermore, since 1998, the WRPBs fall under complete 
control of MWR. SEPA has still set up its own water quality monitoring sites.  
Now there exist two monitoring networks in some of China’s major rivers. MWR 
and SEPA do not share their network data with each other (Wang 2006, 9). 
 
Institutional Conflicts 
 
SEPA and MWR follow the same State-prescribed analytical procedures and 
water quality standards in their water quality studies.  However, the monitoring 
results in the same river often differ. An interesting example is the divergence on 
water quality data of Huai River. According to the monitoring data from the 
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MWR’s RBO, more than half of the river quality was worse than type V in 2003 
(Li Shilin, 2004).  
 
In the same year, SEPA announced in its annual China Environment Bulletin that 
most of the stretches of the river was type IV (Li Shilin, 2004). This contradiction 
diverged even more with SEPA reporting the total amount of Chemical Oxygen 
Demand (COD) emissions in 2003 as approximately 700 thousand tons. COD is 
used to indirectly measure the amount of organic compounds and pollutants in 
water, making it a useful test of water quality.  SEPA implied water quality had 
almost been restored in the past ten years. Conversely, the MWR monitoring 
issued another figure of 1,230 thousand tons, almost approaching the maximal 
level in history (Li Shilin, 2004). This continuing mismatch of results between 
SEPA and MWR is counterproductive and results in poor water environment 
quality.   
 
Another major problem is coordination between trans-boundary agencies. In 
China’s top-down political structure, most trans-boundary affairs depend on the 
intervention and coordination of the central government (CCICED Task Force, 
2004). Therefore, it is very difficult for the riparian provinces to solve problems 
by equal negotiation. Riparian provinces compete with each other to seek 
resolutions from the central government (Wang 2003b, 9).    
 
This can be seen in runoff allocation development. Among the seven major river 
basins in Chinese territory, the runoff allocation scheme only has been 
implemented in the Yellow River Basin (Wang 2007, 403). Since most trans-
boundary rivers have not allocated runoff, it is difficult to implement the Water 
Law (2002)—Total Amount Control (TAC) system. TAC puts restrictions on 
districts for their total water withdrawal (Wang 2007, 404).   
 
Enforcement Difficulties 
 
There are also enforcement problems that hinder the current laws. In areas with 
long-term water conflicts, the formulation of a water allocation scheme is a time-
consuming process. It demands drawn-out negotiations and compromises among 
the riparian provinces (Wang 2007, 405). Even if provinces and districts in a river 
basin come to an agreement on the runoff allocation, there remain difficulties in 
guaranteeing enforcement. For example, riparian provinces did not comply with 
the allocation scheme of the Yellow River that the State Council approved in 
1987. In the 1990s, actual withdrawals by Shandong Province and Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region exceeded their permitted quotas.  This caused the flow cut-
off situation in the lower reaches to worsen (Wang 2004, 204).  
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Taihu Lake serves as another example.  Legislation is being urged for the Taihu 
Lake basin area. It covers two provinces and one municipality (Yanfeng, China 
Daily, 2010). However, officials state that administrative barriers among the 
governments of the three different regions and their self-interests have hindered 
improvements in Taihu Lake’s water quality. Cross-region legislation is vital to 
ensure efficient cooperation among them (Wang 2007, 403). Zhang Quan, director 
of the Shanghai Municipal EPB, has submitted a proposal to the ongoing 
National People’s Congress session.  He calls for the establishment of a central 
commission on the protection of Taihu Lake water quality.  He also calls for 
comprehensive cooperation among regions in the upper and lower reaches of the 
Lake (Yanfeng, China Daily, 2010).  
 
The current governing body for the area is affiliated with the MWR. It is only 
responsible for flood prevention and utilization of water resources. It cannot 
address water pollution problems. Taihu Lake has witnessed massive outbreaks 
of blue-green algae in recent years despite efforts to cut pollution discharges into 
the Lake. One such outbreak disrupted water supplies to one million residents of 
Wuxi in 2007 (Yanfeng, China Daily, 2010). Further exacerbating the problem is 
the fact that very few provisions are provided for measures against non-
compliers (World Bank 2001, 137). The Environmental Information Disclosure Decree 
(EIDD) (2008) provides punishment for non-disclosure, with a maximum fine of 
100,000 Yuan (Xie, Jian 2009, 53).  This is too low to be an effective disincentive.  
Current laws also do not specify how to provide compensation for the losses 
caused by noncompliance with information disclosure requirements. 
 
Lack of a Unified Legislative and Procedural System 
 
The Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) (1989) was adopted into law to 
institutionalise the ‘principle of democratic centralism’. It was also supposed to 
ensure that administration be carried out in accordance with law (Cheng, Jianfu, 
216).  However, the ALL (1989) does not include principles of control or 
supervision of power. Article 1 of the ALL (1989) provides that it is enacted to 
protect the rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organisations. 
It is to safeguard and supervise the administration organs in the exercise of their 
authority and functions (Chen, Jianfu, 222).   
 
The 1996 Administrative Penalties Law (APL) and the 2003 Law on Administrative 
Licensing (LAL) stipulate the procedural requirements.  They deal with the 
misuse and abuse of administrative powers and lack of procedural control of 
administrative decision-making (Chen 2008, 228). However, a comprehensive 
code on administrative procedures has not been produced. Internal reviews of 
administrative decisions are regulated by the Administrative Reconsideration Law 
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(1999) (Chen 2008, 227). Nevertheless, there is still an absence of administrative 
legal regulations and transparency.  This is particularly true for water rights, 
which undermine the ALL (1989), LAL (2003), and APL (1996) (Chen 2008, 227).   
 
First, legislative conflicts in the administrative legal framework prevent a unified 
legal framework and coordinated institutions. For example, the WPPC (1996) and 
Water Law (2002) are inconsistent. They are notably missing important 
ingredients for river basin governance (Ongley and Wang 2004, 4). This includes 
public participation provisions, requirements for information sharing among 
government agencies, and measures to enforce non-point pollution management.  
 
Second, water regulation laws are drafted by the ministries that are later given 
power to enforce them. For example, the WPPC (1996) and the Water Law (2002) 
give power to SEPA and MWR, respectively. They hold that “power” is vested in 
the ministry by virtue of “their” law (Ongley and Wang 2004, 4). In other words, 
water legislation is created as “sector-based laws” instead of “universal laws.”  
Thus, a unified framework of river governance is difficult to create. Third, laws 
cannot be implemented in practice (Qu Geping 2004, 412). Reasons include 
China’s huge population, scarce environmental resources, fragile ecological 
carrying capacity, economic developing pressures, and the overly top-down 
political power structure.  The political power top-down structure lacks leverage 
of power over local governments (Qu Geping 2004).  
 
Fourth, RBOs are not real spokesmen for river basins.  They have little 
administrative power.  They are not mandated to manage river basins in a 
holistic context (World Bank 2001, 125).  An integrated regime of river basin 
management has not yet been established in China either. Fifth, WRPBs manage 
quantity and quality of water in a fragmented manner.  This is due to the inter-
ministerial struggles between SEPA and MWR (Xie, Jian 2009, 133). Sixth, current 
river basin commissions of China’s seven major rivers are nominal committees 
without members. These RBOs coordinate trans-boundary benefits as an agency 
of central government (World Bank 2001, 128). Again, this top-down river 
governance structure makes trans-boundary conflicts difficult to coordinate in the 
current decentralized economic system. In addition, stakeholder involvement and 
public participation in water management decision-making is very limited (Wang 
2004, 212).   
 
The absence of these administrative legal mechanisms originates from the lack of 
relevant provisions in the existing administrative laws. There are absences in 
legal provisions on trans-jurisdictional and cross-departmental coordination 
(Ongley and Wang 2004, 6). There is also a lack of legal procedures and methods 
for the settlement of trans-jurisdictional water disputes. The national trans-
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jurisdictional water resources management legislation is not procedural. Without 
any coordination offered by procedural provisions, it is very difficult to realize 
the objectives of substantive provisions (Xie, Jian 2009, 134).  
 
Although regulations and laws specify organs for settling water disputes and 
pollution disputes, they lack provisions for how parties in disputes can apply for 
settlement.  The law also does not specify what the settlement steps and 
formalities are, nor does it specify time limits for complaints to be registered, or 
how to appear in case a refusal to settlement occurs (Qu Geping 2004, 411). Once 
disputes occur, parties involved and management departments in many cases 
have no idea of what course to take.  This leads to constant postponement of the 
dispute without any decisive result (Xie, Jian 2009, 135).  
 
Poor Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Another significant issue is the lack of effective environmental damage 
compensation and insurance systems.  In particular, pollution damage 
identification and evaluation systems are lacking (CCICED Task Force, 2004). 
This includes there being no current legal basis/precedent for the judgment of a 
violation of a water law, including a standard for what is deemed a violation of 
the law, a standard of what can be identified as a pollution incident, a 
standard/regulated assessment of the pollution and damages caused, a set 
standard of penalties/fines for the polluter, or a corresponding liability plan like a 
water pollution liability insurance plan (CCICED Task Force, 2004). For sectors 
and enterprises with major environmental risks, no compulsory insurance system 
for environmental damages has been established yet.  It is difficult to gain 
expenses for accident settlement and damage compensation from enterprises 
involved (Li Shilin, 2004).  
 
An important reason for this is the presence of local protectionism in practice. 
According to the EPL, local governments are responsible for the environmental 
quality within their own regions (Xie, Jian, 2009, 129). For enterprises that cause 
severe environmental pollution, local governments shall order them to treat 
pollution within a specified time limit (Xie, Jian, 2009, 130).  They will also shut 
down those that fail to complete treatment tasks within the time limit.  
 
However, in practice, many local governments and enterprises focus only on 
immediate economic benefits.  They think little of developing new production 
equipment and process technologies.  As a result, much equipment currently 
used is obsolete and operate with defects.  The use of obsolete equipment has 
become major cause of water pollution accidents (Qu Geping 2004, 411). Local 
environmental protection departments also rely heavily on local governments for 
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financial   expenditure and personnel matters. Therefore, environmental 
protection objectives are less valued than economic development goals.  This is 
regardless of substantive provisions related to environmental protection, 
pollution discharge and law enforcement (Xie, Jian 2009, 135).  
 
In summary, the central problem is the ineffective enforcement of legal 
institutions.  This mirrors challenges faced by the water quantity management 
regime.   In short, China’s pollution control is constrained by several issues 
including: (a) failure to implement water pollution prevention and control plans 
due to institutional conflicts; (b) problems with monitoring and enforcement; (c) 
lack of integrated river basin management (Xie, Jian, 2009, 301). 
 
 
Review and Consolidation of Existing Law 
 
At present, legal defects exist in trans-jurisdictional water pollution management 
in China. This includes problems in coordination among laws, absence of legal 
systems, and slack law enforcement. Also, substantial defects exist in the 
institutional arrangements for trans-jurisdictional water pollution management. 
This is especially true for administrative coordination among central and local 
authorities. Water resources and environmental protection departments also have 
substantial institutional defects.  
 
It is imperative to make adjustments in management organs. Furthermore, 
mechanism-building is critical to trans-jurisdictional water pollution 
management. Legal adjustments must be carried forward concurrently with 
institutional reform. However, due to the involvement of substantial department 
interests, institutional arrangements will face huge resistance. Institutional 
reform will proceed slowly. Therefore, institutions, mechanisms, and laws need 
to be promoted concurrently.  
 
At present, China is still in a period of reform and transition. Legislative and 
institutional adjustments need to be made gradually.  In the short term, two tasks 
should be focused on.  First is enhancing high-level inter-departmental 
coordination mechanisms.  The second task is revising the WPPC (1996) and the 
Water Law (2002). Mid-term reform should include institutional adjustments.  
There should also be established river basin management organs. These should 
promote inter-departmental coordination and public participation.  They should 
actively probe into legislation on river basin management.  
 
Long-term reforms should establish river basin management organs with wide 
participation of stakeholders. They need to carry out work with rights authorized 
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by laws.  They also need to form democratic, coordinative and efficient river 
basin management models. Likewise, river management decision-making and 
implementation should be separated. To summarise, China needs a permanent 
inter-ministerial coordination arrangement.  This arrangement needs to deal with 
the institutional arrangements and operational practices between SEPA and 
MWR. Inter-ministerial conflict has strong connections with the deficiencies in 
the legal framework for water quality and water quantity management. Therefore 
it is crucial that China create better legislation to amend the deficiencies in the 
pollution prevention and control laws of the WPPC (1996) and its implementing 
rules. Equally important is the need to harmonize various laws, especially the 
relationship between the water pollution control and water quantity laws. 
 
Implementation of Laws 
 
Of course, improving law enforcement is the number one priority to make the 
legal framework useful and effective. As stipulated in the State Council’s 
Compendium of Implementation for Fully Promoting Law-Based Administration (2004) 
(Xie, Jian 2009, 42), a series of actions need to be taken:  
1) Detailed guidelines for implementing the WPPC (1996) should be developed.   
a) The existing systems of total pollutant control and pollution emission 
permits should be improved.  
2) Supervision and inspection by the national and local congresses and 
administrative branches should be strengthened.  
a) Adequate budget and personnel for such inspection and supervision 
should be provided by law; 
b) Local agencies responsible for law enforcement should be independent of 
local authorities. 
3) Public-private partnerships should be encouraged by laws and regulations.  
a)  These partnerships should help monitor and track down violators;   
b) They should supervise local agencies responsible for law enforcement.  
4) The Water Law (2002) should clearly define the authorities, responsibilities, 
and coordination mechanism for different administrative organisations  
a) Including the MWR, (Ministry of Environmental Protection MEP, River 
Basin Management Commissions RBMCs, and relevant organisations at 
the local level. 
i) It should clarify the linkages between all these organisations; 
ii)  Clarify the status, responsibilities, operational mechanisms, and 
process of RBMCs.   
5) For other water-related laws and regulations, amendments are needed to 
make them consistent with the Water Law (2002) and the newly amended 
WPPC (1996). 
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To add to the State Council’s recommendations listed above, the role of RBMCs 
in planning, allocation, and development of water resources should be legally-
specified as well.  This should be done preferably in primary legislation. Local 
governments should be required by law to be members of the RBMCs in 
planning in water resource management.   
 
It is also important and feasible to strengthen coordination among agencies. 
Establishing a proper coordinating mechanism can do this. The mechanism 
should include regular interagency consultation, and compulsory information 
sharing.   Cross review and endorsement of relevant policies and plans should 
also be implemented.  Finally, joint policy-making is needed for coordinating 
mechanisms.   For coordination, a restructuring of water management 
governmental organisations must take place. One option is to establish a State 
Water Resources Commission (SWRC).  The SWRC could serve as a coordinating 
and steering organisation on water-related affairs across the country. It should be 
chaired by the premier and members would be heads of all water-related 
ministries/agencies at the central level.  It would direct the development of a 
national water strategy. It would also examine long-term plans for water 
development, allocation, and use.  In addition, it would coordinate all water-
related ministries/agencies to avoid policy inconsistency and conflicts before they 
are implemented.  
At the ministry level, an option would be to merge major water-related duties 
currently put under the different government agencies (namely MWR, MEP).  A 
new super ministry could be established instead.  This ministry would 
implement a unified management of water quantity and quality, water resource 
conservation and use, and water environmental protection.  
 
River basin commissions for all major rivers and lakes that run across different 
provinces/municipalities should also be established. Specific provisions should be 
added to the Water Law (2002) to provide legal status.  These provisions should 
also clarify the authorities/responsibilities of the new type of RBMCs. Existing 
RBMCs should be reshaped to give them more authority and independence. 
RBMCs could consider the involvement of representatives from the MEP.  They 
would eventually become independent of MWR.  They would be held 
accountable to the State Council directly. Their governing board should include 
representatives from both the central government and provincial/municipal 
governments.  This would ensure appropriate accountability for basin-wide 
water resources management. 
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Right to Information 
 
Transparency and information disclosure is also crucial. In the Compendium of 
Implementation for Fully Promoting Law-Based Administration (2004), administrative 
agencies are required to open to the public all governmental information. In 2005, 
the Guidance for Further Enforcing Openness of Administrative Affairs (GFEOAA) 
was promulgated (Xie, Jian 2009, pg. 51). In April 2007, the Government 
Information Disclosure Regulation (GIDR), which came into effect on May 1, 2008, 
defines the range of government information.  The GIDR (2008) sets methods and 
procedure for information disclosure, designs dispute resolution mechanisms, 
and provides specific provisions on performance supervision (Xie, Jian 2009, 52). 
 
 The MWR also issued GFEOAA for Water Management (2005), and the MWR’s 
Provisional Regulation on Openness of Administrative Affairs (2006). These define the 
scope of information that should be disclosed to the public.  They also define the 
various forms of information disclosure, including official bulletins and public 
hearings to web-based channels (Xie, Jian 2009, 53). The Regulation of Hydrology 
(RH), (2007), focused on water quality monitoring and also set requirements on 
information disclosure. SEPA also issued official documents to enhance 
information disclosure (Xie 2009, 52). The Provisional Regulation on Public 
Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment (PRPPEIA) (2005), defines the 
scope of information that project organisations should make available to the 
public. It also defines forms of disclosure and time limits for disclosure. MEP’s 
EIDD (2008), makes it a compulsory responsibility for enterprises and 
governments to disclose their important environmental information to the public 
(Xie, Jian 2009, 53).  
Local governments have, as well, promulgated regulations and policies to 
promote water-related information disclosure. Reports on the state of large river 
basins have been delivered on an annual basis (Xie 2009, 52).  These reports 
provide information on water conditions and management in whole river basins. 
As a result, the public has better access to water-related information, and the 
administration of water issues is much more transparent than before (Xie 2009, 
52).  
 
However, most of the information that existing regulations, RH (2007), EIDD 
(2008), and PRPPEIA (2005), require to be made open to the public is on 
government organisations in charge of water affairs and their responsibilities and 
behaviors (Wang 2003b, 15). Information on water itself is not emphasized.  This 
includes water quality and quantity, and water users and pollution sources. Such 
information is not only inaccessible to the public, but also inaccessible to other 
governmental organisations outside local government organisations (Wang 
2003b, 16).  
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Specific organisations responsible for water management keep the information 
collected and do not share it with other organisations. Each organisation has its 
own database (Wang 2003b, 16). The information issued is often not consistent. In 
existing regulations, the definition of what information should be disclosed to the 
public is not clearly defined. As a result, some organisations take advantage of 
the vagueness of the regulations and refuse to disclose water-related information 
(Wang 2003b, 16).  
 
For example, the current regulations require that all information except that 
related to state secrets, business secrets, or personal privacy be open to the public 
(Wang 2003b, 17). However, there is no clear definition of what information 
relates to state secrets or business secrets. Therefore, some enterprises refuse to 
disclose water-related information in the name of protecting state secrets or 
business secrets (Ongley and Wang 2004, 5).  
 
Additionally, the lax legal requirements mentioned earlier and weak supervision 
leads to poor public participation activities (CCICED Task Force, 2004). Public 
hearings and expert assessments do not follow the procedures for selecting 
representatives of stakeholders and experts. Some organizers tend to select those 
in favor of the views or interests of the organizers (World Bank 2001, 137). It is 
evident that the citizens’ right of access to information is not properly defined in 
formal laws.  There are very few clauses on information disclosure in the Water 
Law (2002) and in the WPPC (1996). Additionally, in the existing regulations on 
information disclosure, the provisions on the procedure of information disclosure 
are not detailed.  
 
These regulations on information disclosure are not implemented effectively 
because of weak supervision by both the government and the public (World Bank 
2011, 136).  Public information disclosure requirements should be incorporated in 
all major development strategies, policies, regulations, and operational 
procedures. Relevant governmental organisations should regularly release to the 
public information on water quality and pollution sources. The information must 
be accessible for the public and concerned groups/ communities and be made 
available through multiple channels. 
 
Concurrently, the legal basis for information disclosure needs restructuring. 
Currently, the legal provisions on public participation in water management are 
incomplete. In the Water Law (2002), the citizens’ rights to access to information, 
to participate in decision-making, and to question and supervise governmental 
agencies, are not clearly stated (Ongley and Wang 2004, 21).  There are also few 
legal provisions for the public to challenge government decision-making through 
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litigation or judicial review. Provisions and regulations on the procedure and 
mechanisms of public participation are also not detailed.  This leads to distorted 
implementation.  Also, though government agencies should respond to appeals 
of the public, it is not clear how they should respond. China should add clauses 
in the Water Law (2002), and WPPC (1996) to emphasize the citizens’ right of 
access to environmental information. The clauses should also make information 
disclosure a compulsory obligation of governmental organisations, water 
companies, enterprises discharging pollutants, and other major stakeholders.   
 
The government should also define in the laws/regulations the scope of 
information that is supposed to be disclosed to the public. In conjunction, the 
scope of information regarded as state secrets or business secrets subject to 
protection needs to be defined.  The forms, procedures, and time requirements 
for information disclosure must also be specified. In addition, the government 
should draft clauses on the liability of those who have not disclosed information 
as required, and measures against noncompliance.  
 
In short, three rights should be clearly defined:  
1. The right of access to information,  
2. The right of participation in decision-making,  
3. The right to challenge water-related decisions by the government.  
 
Specific and detailed provisions should be made on forms, steps, and procedures 
of public participation.  This would avoid any distortion in practice, either 
deliberately or unconsciously. Provisions should also be made for administrative 
re-examination, litigation, or administrative punishment against behaviours 
infringing the aforementioned rights granted by law.  
 
As recommended above, a representative water management organisation or 
commission should be established at the river-basin level for each river basin. 
Membership in the organisation should be further extended to not only central 
and local government agencies but also representatives of various stakeholders.  
The stakeholders should include water suppliers, water users, and the general 
public. At the current stage, to facilitate participation of water users, China 
should encourage and support the establishment of such organisations as water 
users associations and involve them in water management. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, China should continue to strengthen the administrative legal 
framework for water resource management and pollution control.  The 
government needs to focus on improving compliance and enforcement.  This 
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needs to especially be done by strengthening public participation. The laws also 
need to incorporate an integrated approach to water management.  The 
institutional structure of China's government lacks effective vertical or horizontal 
accountability. For example, the environmental regulatory agencies are often 
subordinate to the very agencies they are intended to regulate. This structural 
administrative relationship between the provinces and the central government 
often results in a chronic inability on the part of the government to provide 
public goods like environmental protection.  
 
The major tasks now are to specify the central-local jurisdictions.  The 
government also needs to eliminate the elements of the old revenue-sharing 
system left in the new tax-sharing system. Further, a law on the central-local 
relationship should be created.  The central government also needs to ensure 
adequate flexibility in allowing the provinces to develop themselves on the basis 
of different local conditions. New laws are needed which provide specific 
detailed divisions of powers.  This will legalise and systematize the relations 
between the centre and the provinces.  
 
A legal system should also be established for regional coordination. Specific laws 
focusing on industrial distribution and usage and protection of water resources 
should be enacted first.  A general law should follow this on regional 
development.  The government should also grant legal status to river basin 
management commissions. Institutionally, China should set up a Water Resource 
Management Commission.  It should have the proper authority and capacity for 
coordinating different sectors and provinces/municipalities in order to implement 
integrated water management. This must be done in conjunction with 
establishing a more effective mechanism for coordinating different governmental 
organisations at central and local levels.  At the same time, RBMCs need to be 
reformed to balance the interests of various stakeholders.   
 
In terms of policy instruments, China should combine various instruments, 
including command-and-control measures, information disclosure, and public 
participation. In designing policies, information disclosure and public 
participation in various forms should be promoted.  This will impose pressure on 
polluters and administrations to avoid temporally and spatially-biased 
behaviour.  It will also protect the public. Finally, strengthening democratic 
institutions at grassroots level – that is, village and township elections – may 
have the greatest potential to bring accountability into water pollution law 
enforcement. With electoral pressure, local leaders should also have incentive to 
listen to residents and provide adequate public goods to their jurisdictions. 
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THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FIELD 
Wasim Al-Habil1 
 
This paper describes and traces the modern thought and the state of public 
administration throughout the history of American Public Administration. 
The paper argues that logical positivism and instrumental rationality, which 
are the underpinnings of modern thought, have captivated public 
administration. The paper demonstrates the fact that public administration is a 
human science, set within a given social context, and, therefore, is imbued with 
human values. This attitude was ignored by positivism and tried to be treated 
by the new logic of inquiry of Postmodernism.   
 
Introduction 
This paper describes and traces the modern thought and the state of the public 
administration (PA) throughout the history of the American PA. The paper 
argues that logical positivism and instrumental rationality, which are the 
underpinnings of modern thought, have captivated PA. Modernity challenges a 
problem as it believes in a neutral and universal administrative science, which 
might be attained once the ‘right’ reforms are made. However, public 
administration is a human science, set within a social context, and, therefore, is 
imbued with human values.  
In addition, orthodox applications of modernity pose a threat to democratic ideas 
as they deny active citizenship participation and put all decision-making in the 
hands of technical experts or bureaucrats (Stivers 1990). On the other hand, 
postmodernism is everything that modernity is not.  It rejects the one right 
answer as it allows suspicion to question foundations of knowledge. It moves 
from the grand narrative to smaller, local narratives that engage conversational 
groups in various subjects and debates in PA. However, this is not without 
danger as collusions of narratives can leave people confused and disoriented 
with the multitude of controversial issues. 
The Roots of Modern Public Administration 
Guy Adams (1994) defined modernity in a way that characterises the world by 
“secularisation, the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, the 
differentiation of the various spheres of the life-world, [and] the 
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bureaucratisation of economics” (p. 26). Through this definition, it is essential to 
note the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, which is an important 
element in defining modernity. Instrumental rationality is portrayed as a 
technical “way of thinking and living that emphasises the scientific-analytical 
mind-set and the belief in technological process” (Adam 1994, 26). 
These ideas are not new ones as they came from the 17th century Enlightenment 
to emerge in the United States during the Progressive Era when the field of Public 
Administration was being founded. The Progressive Era in the United States was 
a period of social activism and political reform that flourished from the 1840s to 
the 1920s. One main goal of the Progressive movement was purification of 
government, as Progressives tried to eliminate corruption by exposing and 
undercutting political machines and directors (Buenker, Burnham and Crunden 
1986). Many Progressives supported prohibition in order to destroy the political 
power of local bosses and promote women's political rights; they also aimed at 
improving efficiency in every sector by identifying old ways that needed 
modernizing, and emphasizing scientific, medical and engineering solutions 
(Buenker 1980). These ideas have prevailed during the founding period of PA as 
a self-conscious field, which is commonly agreed upon to be during or just before 
the Progressive Era (Marini and Pugh 1983; Adams 1995). He adds that these 
ideas are still dominant in contemporary PA, which is studied in universities.  
With the strong shape of instrumental rationality, Adams (1994) argues that the 
foundation of PA as a field of study has led the field to be set in a particular 
framework. This framework is represented by the level of scientific methodology 
that PA should utilise to reach its ends. However, this particular framework 
created the trajectory of the field of PA which shaped all the major evolutions and 
new paradigms that have emerged into the field since that time.  
The politics-administration dichotomy is an example of the influence of this 
scientific framework of positivism. In general, positivism can be defined as the 
“history of ideas, concepts, theories, and opinions about the nature of the world, 
our ability to know it, and our ability to change it” (White 1999, 13). White (1999) 
asserts that the purpose of positivist research is to explain and predict natural 
and social events. This purpose can be reached through “the development of a 
collection of related and testable law-like statements that express causal 
relationships among relevant variables” (White 1999, 44). Fay (1975) emphasises 
the goal of this approach in social sciences when he states that the “knowledge 
gained from social sciences will enable men to control their social environment” 
(p.19). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) summarise the basic assumptions of positivism as the 
following: (a) social and natural sciences should have the same goals; (b) the goal 
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is to discover laws that lead to explanations and predictions; (c) social sciences 
should use the same methodology of naturals sciences; (d) concepts should be 
defined by empirical categories; (e) there is uniformity of nature in time and 
space; and (f) the laws of nature should be driven from date. Positivists think that 
“there is a correct way of proceeding in human affairs and that is the 
responsibility of the decision-maker to discover what this way is” (p. 28). 
However, being outside this framework, other concepts and theories found 
themselves in a hot conflict and endless debate with the scientific approach. The 
theoretical and practical conflicts in the field can be categorised and understood 
based on their logics or on what is well known in PA as the politics-
administration dichotomy. This dichotomy reflects the conflict between the 
value-driven political logic and the neutral scientific logic of handling 
administration. The instrumental rationality of modernity presented the concepts 
of efficiency, effectiveness, expertise, professionalism, accountability, and 
democracy and other issues in PA. 
Therefore, PA as a field of study was highly influenced by modernity or 
positivism as a way of thinking and producing knowledge. The natural sciences 
approaches may probably have caused some pressure on social sciences to 
increase their rigour in research. Management was one of the social science fields 
that responded to this pressure by the attempt to follow the positivist approach 
and to deal with PA in a more business-like manner.  
Beginning approximately from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment, 
modern thought developed out of the combination of various circumstances in 
Europe, (Skoble and Machlan 1999). Skoble and Machlan state that “the 
development of a sizable middle class, increased trade relations between nations, 
explorations and developments in science and technology, all created a climate in 
which many things taken for granted in the Middle Ages were called into 
question” (Skoble and Machlan 1999, 123). In addition, they argue that out of that 
“intellectual climate”, important concepts about politics and social justice, such as 
government by consent, the social contract, individual rights, women’s rights, 
socialism, anarchism as well as liberalism, evolved. The earliest thinkers 
influenced the research methodology in the field. For example, Descartes 
declared his scientific approach, “I think; therefore I exist,” (Marshall, 1996, p. 
117). Niccolo Machiavelli “created the world within modern public 
administration exists” in terms of creating a perspective where the state is serving 
people’s interests (Swain, 1998, p.78). Machiavelli’s perspective influenced both 
scholars and themes of public administration. His perspective influenced scholars 
like Gulick’s view of executive functions as well as Taylor’s “technique oriented, 
means-ends rationality, empirical and material view” (Swain, 1998, p. 93). Other 
modern thinkers who contributed to public administration thought are Hobbes, 
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Locke, Montesquieu, and the Founders (Swain, 1998), as well the seminal figure 
of the Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Smith (Farmer, 1998).  
Common themes of modern thought are “secularisation, the universalistic claims 
of instrumental rationality, the differentiation of various spheres of life-world, the 
bureaucratisation of economic, political, and military practices, and the growing 
monitarisation of values” (Turner 1990, 6, cited in Adams, 1995). Jürgen 
Habermas writes: 
“The project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, 
universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic. At 
the same time, this project intended to release the cognitive potentials of each of 
these domains from their esoteric forms. The enlightenment philosophers wanted 
to utilize this accumulation of specialized culture for the enrichment of everyday 
life- that is to say, for the rational organisisationsation of every day social life” 
(Habermas cited in Farmer 1995). 
David Farmer contends that the public administration theory “could be described 
as one form of this rationalissation of every day social life” (Farmer, 1995, p. 36). 
Adams adds the notion of technical rationality and states the “scientific-analytical 
mind-set” that signifies modern thought, and the “Great Transformations” of the 
19th century such as technological progress and industrialisation, combined just 
before and at the beginning of the Progressive Era and “unleashed a flood of 
ideas into the social and political world” (Adams 1995, 26).  
Struggling Logic of Inquires in Public Administration 
The Progressive Era, which started with Woodrow Wilson as its most prominent 
figure, is distinguished as an era of reform. Despite some opposition (Van Riper, 
1997), Woodrow Wilson, in his article The Study of Public Administration (1887), 
was the first one in academia who calls for the separation of administration from 
politics. He called for developing a science of PA as well as detaching PA from 
political considerations. This was the first clear call for using scientific logic in the 
field of PA (Henry, 1997). 
Frank Goodnow, in his book Politics and Administration (1900), also followed the 
scientific logic of inquiry and believed that politics and administration could be 
distinguished. The school of scientific management, which was led by Fredrick 
Taylor, also had a strong influence on PA to follow the positivist logic. Scholars 
who came later to participate in establishing PA as a practical and academic field 
of study were influenced by the scientific logic. Leonard White, with his first 
textbook in the field, An Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1926), 
Luther Gulick in his book, The Papers on the Science of Administration (1937), the 
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Brownlow Report of the President’s Committee, and later, the New Public 
Management School, all presented the scientific logic of inquiry in PA.  
On the other hand, others such as Waldo in The Administrative State (1948), the 
New Public Administration School in the 1970s, the Blacksburg Manifesto 
document in the 1980s, and the New Public Service School, all criticized the 
positivist logic of inquiry. In addition, scholars such as Herbert Simon in the 
Administrative Behavior (1947), Elton Mayo, and Fritz Roethisberger did not refuse 
the scientific methodology, but they did not accept positivism as “a one right way 
to do things”. In general, according to White (1999), the positivist research has 
played a significant role in the field since the early 1900s, as the scientific 
principles of administration. However, this approach has been criticised by many 
scholars in the field, since the late 1960s, because of its limitations. For example, 
Farmer in his book, The Language of Public Administration, criticised this particular, 
scientific, and technological framework of the PA because of its limitations and 
inability to resolve all PA problems. This point leads to discuss why modernity 
and positivism may be problematic for public administration, which will be 
discussed later in the paper. 
The generation of knowledge in public administration has been the focus of many 
scholars (White 1999; White and Adams 1995; White et al 1996; McCurdy and 
Cleary 1984; Hummel 1991). For example, Gulick argues that the best source of 
gaining knowledge is through our experiences while Simon states that science 
with rational methodology and measurement is the tool for gaining the 
knowledge. Some argue that the field lacks rigor and validity as it “does not 
employ agreed upon methods and research designs for analysing and classifying 
data” (McCurdy and Cleary 1984) and take a post-positivist approach. Others 
disagree and argue that interpreting experiences contributes to the generation of 
knowledge and are credible sources to draw upon (Hummel, 1991, p.31). This 
debate about what kind of knowledge we need in the field and what kind of 
knowledge that can be applicable and usable in PA is still continuous and up-to-
date.  
The Impact of the Progressive Era on PA 
Adams argues that the philosophy of the Progressive Era, which was the 
convergence of modern thought and technical rationality, is still dominant in the 
contemporary PA. He is “content that the fundamental trajectory of knowledge 
and theory development in public administration also dates from the 1877-1920 
period” (Adams 1995 29). Along with Adams, Laurence O’Toole claims that the 
basic reform concepts and practices prevalent in public administration today, are 
attributed to the Progressive period. These claims receive credibility when looked 
at from the politics administration dichotomy. 
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This dichotomy entails the logical division of facts and values. It demands that 
“politics should not intrude on administration; management lends itself to 
scientific study; public administration is capable of becoming a value-free science 
of its own right; [and] the mission of administration is economy and efficiency” 
(Henry 1997 41-42). The idea that efficient government is what the people want 
has also been part of the Federalist argument.  Looking at the reforms that have 
been made during the Progressive period and since, such as the Taft 
Commission, the Brownlow Commission, the Hoover Commissions, the Ash 
Council, the Grace Commission as well as the National Performance Review, it 
can be seen that they all have been efforts to make government more rational, 
efficient and effective by making it more neutral and technical. The contemporary 
PA that shares these principles and notions is represented by the New Public 
Management, which calls for accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
government’s performance.  
Why is Modernity Problematic for Public Administration? 
Public administration suffers from the problem of the logical division between 
facts and values if modernity is seen as the thoughts of logical positivism and 
instrumental rationalism. The research and theory level as well as the governance 
level are cracked by this division.  
On research level, the problem of epistemology emerges: how and why can we 
know things (White, 1999)? McCurdy and Cleary claim that the modern 
conjecture entails post-positivist approaches to research and challenges the field 
as lacking rigor and credibility (1984). Modern research is described as an 
explanatory mode of inquiry that defends the fundamental belief: an objective 
reality exists and that reality can be explained and understood through testing 
hypotheses and establishing statistical significance. According to explanatory 
research, the researcher is the neutral observer, trying to verify hypotheses 
through rigorous empirical tests. These are agreed upon methods (McCurdy & 
Cleary, 1984) through which findings can gain credibility and validation. To have 
the ultimate tool for prediction and control, a tight relationship between cause 
and effect can be established through the assertion of causality. In the aptitude to 
predict rests a certain power (Fay, 1975), because prediction implies the capacity 
to manipulate and ultimately control the object of study or society.  
Cautious of the dangers of over-scientification, Neil Smelser states that “there is 
the danger of what you might call a fetishism of technique, the danger of 
overemphasis on the scientific side” (Smelser cited in White 1999). White agrees 
writing that “many of these studies are a statistical technique in search of a 
question... for the most part, the research is theoretical wasteland” (White 1999, 
36). 
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On the governance level and under the umbrella of science, why is the modern 
positivist administration a problem? Modern thought leads to a problem when 
applied to the administration of government, because the quest for a science of 
administration ultimately conflicts with democratic values. Administration is 
about getting things done while democracy is about expression of will, 
participation, persuasion, and considering the voice of everyone. However, to 
come up with a democratic administration is very difficult because bureaucracy 
is the tool, which is applied in the administration to get the work done. 
Bureaucracy itself is not democratic because it is based on hierarchy. Hence, 
science rules might threaten democracy through two different ways. Firstly, 
science forces the public to take one right answer according to the scientific rules. 
However, democracy is about good judgments, persuasions, and preferences. 
Secondly, the more science becomes rigorous in the field the less capacity is 
available to apply it in practice. This continuous debate in the field is obvious 
through tracing the idea of administrative science from its beginnings to its 
reflection in contemporary public administration. 
The idea of a neutral science of administration has formally started with 
Woodrow Wilson’s call for a scientific study of public administration. He was 
convinced that administrative questions are not political but, rather, business 
questions. He states that, “it [public administration] is removed from the hurry 
and strife of politics” and that public administration’s part in political life is “only 
as machinery is part of a manufactured product” (Wilson, 1887, p. 20). Therefore 
administrative science had to be set “upon foundations laid deep in stable 
principle” (Wilson, 1887, p. 20). This was to be accomplished by a cadre of 
technical experts. However, the idea that a gentile elite who could divorce their 
values from their administrative practices, should administer government was 
not new, it has already been part of the Federalist argument, whereas the Farmers 
pushed for a government administered by the middle class.   
This call for a scientific study of administration has influenced the direction of the 
field resulting in emergence of ‘principles’. As stated above, a modern science 
aims to study natural phenomena in order to be able to predict certain events to 
ultimately control the outcome.  Shafritz and Hyde (1997) argue that an obsession 
with organisation and control had started, which resulted in the formation of an 
expert elite or social engineers as Fay names it. The New York Bureau of 
Municipal Research is an example where ambitious and technically-oriented men 
set out to find the best and most efficient ways of ‘cleaning up’ municipalities. 
Stivers (2000) argues that through rigorous application of science municipal 
housekeeping, what originally seemed to be an overtly feminine occupation, 
became a rigorous and masculine job. However, the effort to find ‘the best way’ 
to get a job done in the sake of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy is most 
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evident in Taylor’s “The Principles of Scientific Management” (1911). The idea of 
a neutral science and principles to guide the practice of public administration 
resonates in textbooks written for its systematic study (L. White, 1926). It is also 
evident in other works such as Willoughby’s “Principles of Public 
Administration”, Henry Fayol’s 14 principles, and ultimately Luther Gulick’s 
POSDCORB principles.  
Herbert Simon criticised these ‘principles’ and argued that they lacked all 
scientific rigor and they could be mere proverbs. He deconstructed Gulick’s 
POSDCORB and dethroned them as confusing facts with values and lacking all 
scientific rigors (Stillman, 2000). In his book ‘Administrative Behavior: A Study of 
Decision Making Process in Administrative Organization’ (1947), he draws on 
“logical positivist continental analytic philosophy” (Stillmann, 2000, p. 22) to 
explain administrative behaviour. He sets out to re-find the field based on a 
rational decision-making model called ‘bounded rationality.’  
Dwight Waldo opposed Simon, in his book entitled “The Administrative State” 
(1948), stating that through 60 years of PA in America there has been no progress 
in the name of democracy and service to the public. Furthermore, he argues that 
PA could never be a value-neutral science, because even if all neutral facts were 
at hand, the remaining question would be which line of action to take and that 
decision is a completely political one. This debate between Dwight Waldo and 
Herbert Simon marked the end of the orthodox era and replaced the politics-
administration dichotomy with the logical division between value laden and 
value neutral.  
Division between Value Laden and Value Neutral 
This division manifested itself in the split between the school of thought which 
still considered public administration as a science, for example, Simon, and the 
school of thought that saw public administration as imbued with values and 
inherently political, for example, Waldo and the Blacksburg school. Whereas the 
former stream of thought developed in the areas of policy science and 
sationorganisational  systems, the latter set out to construct a democratic theory 
of public administration. These efforts resulted in the 1968 Middlebrook 
Conference and the Blacksburg Manifesto, which laid the foundation for the 
inquiry of themes such as participatory democracy, citizenship, equity, and 
ultimately New Public Administration. The former, PA as science, stream of 
thought carried Wilson’s goal for ‘businessification’ and efficiency through 
various reform movements of which each had the goal to make the 
administration of government more efficient and more business-like.  
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Despite the technical criticisms that positivism as the logic of inquiry in 
modernity faces, one can see the problem that this approach causes in PA. In fact, 
the problem is raised when the PA deals with the real life with its complexity of 
values, norms, manner, and habits and so on. PA, as a social science that deals 
with people, faces the traditional problem of politics-administration dichotomy 
when the scientific principles are applied on political cases. Thus, modern science 
in PA faces a problem of disability when it deals with the efficiency and 
professionalism in one hand, and democracy and active citizenship participation 
on the other hand. 
To see an example of how these contradictory values cannot always live together, 
one can observe the major themes that different school in PA introduced. The 
Minnowbrook Conference in 1967 asserted the importance of the democratic 
conceptions in PA. New Public Administration focused on social equity, citizen 
participation as well as organisation responsiveness. This is an example of how 
this school focused only on some political values. On the other hand, when the 
concepts of New Public Management emerged in PA in the mid-1980s, it stressed 
dealing with citizens as “customers”. This view reflects the focus on 
professionalism, competition, and economic principles, and neglects the 
traditional values of PA such as fairness, justice, participation and representation 
(Ventriss, 2000). These two examples of the two different schools with different 
sets of values show the hardness of harmonizing contradictory values in the real 
political environment of PA. The possible disability of modern science to work in 
PA leads the discussion to be focused on postmodernism as another alternative 
for PA.  
The early 90s were marked with the effort to reinvent government; President 
Clinton’s effort to use Osborne and Gaebler’s “Reinventing Government” (1993) 
to transform government into an enterprise. The goal was to bring government 
out of that “sluggish” state and end self-serving bureaucracy (Shafritz & Hyde, 
1997, p. 475). While scholars disagree on whether the Reinventing Government 
Movement can be equated to the current application of reform principles which is 
New Public Management (NPM hereafter), they agree that NPM can be accepted 
as a new orthodoxy (Spicer 2004; Kaboolian 1998; Rosenbloom and Kravchuck 
2002; deLeon and Denhardt 2000). NPM is a theory of governance that is heavily 
influenced by market theory and economic decision-making, public choice, 
principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics in particular (Hood, 1991; 
Kaboolian, 1998), rather than civic choices. NPM is based on scientific-analytical 
and modern, technical-rational western thought (Zanetti and Adams, 2000549). It 
“seek[s] to predict and control both human behaviour and the behaviour of 
organisational  subunits because of the focus on executive decision-making and 
policy implementation” and furthermore “bureaucratic control is essential to this 
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model” implying “conscious self-interested human behaviour” (Marshall cited in 
Ventriss, 20005, 10). Therefore, NPM shifts the relationship of government and its 
citizens from serving the public to serving customers. Focus is on customer 
satisfaction and performance measurement to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the government agency. This approach ultimately replaces the 
notion of civil society and civic behaviour with consumers in a marketplace and 
economic behaviour which was represented and interpreted in Klinenberg’s 
book, Heat Wave.  
Review of Postmodern Public Administration 
It is difficult to have one agreed-upon definition for postmodernism. Jay White 
recognises the diversity of themes and ideas it entails and therefore generally 
defines postmodernism as “the recognition that the Enlightenment’s promises of 
universal truth, justice and beauty would not be realised in modern society” 
(White  1999, 153). Some of the major postmodern philosophers are Jacques 
Lacan, Michael Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, 
and Jean Baudrillard (Fox and Miller 1998). White states that four major themes 
of postmodernism have direct influences on public administration. First, there is 
a question of PA legitimacy due to the lack of a grand narrative. Second, 
linguistics constitutes the basis for all claims of knowledge. Third, the post-
structuralist question regarding whether valid knowledge is attainable, and 
fourth, the understanding that philosophy and science are conversations based 
on common linguistic characteristics of the inquirers.  David Farmer states that 
“postmodernism is scepticism, properly understood”. Furthermore, he argues 
that it negates the core mind-set of modernity. It denies the centred subject, the 
foundationalist and epistemological project, the nature and role of reason, 
macrotheory, grand narratives, and macropolitics. It speaks of the end of history, 
and it denies the distinction between reality and appearance (Farmer, 1995, 
pg.157). 
While postmodernism rejects all modern concepts, it does not want to revert to a 
pre-modern stage. It recognises that there is no Archimedean point nor grand 
narratives, and rejects logical positivism. Instead, it acknowledges that linguistics 
constitutes the base to all knowledge, that every conversational community has 
their own local narrative, and the existence of multiple language games, which 
are “forms of life through which we live and experience the world” (White 1999, 
96). However, this fragmented and disassociated state is not without its 
problems. Conflict arises when narratives conflict, for example war and anti-war 
groups or narratives fall apart, for example the end of the League of Nations. 
When this happens, people are left in confusion and do not know what and who 
to believe. White and Adams argue that the public administration has always had 
traces of postmodernism, as scholars have always engaged in multiple discourses 
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in attempt to formulate theory and make sense of the field. They admit that the 
postmodern condition leaves public administration researchers confused and 
conflicted and urge for interpretivism and critical theory as alternatives for 
theory building. 
David Farmer projects that if public administration is enthralled with 
postmodernism, it will no longer exist as a field: 
 
“In the postmodern situation, scientific inquiry will lose its status as a 
provider of epistemologically privileged information…Postmodernity does spell 
the end of disciplinary autonomy as the age of artificial academic boundaries 
finishes. The structure of public administration collapses as the walls between 
disciplines and specialties fall…Theorizing as it is known terminates” (Farmer 
1995, 225-226). 
 
Conclusion 
Even though this might seem confusing and threatening to some, Farmer (1995) 
sees the resulting period of multiple discourses as an opportunity to push public 
administration thought beyond the grip of our unconscious mind-set. As a 
summary, postmodern public administration is everything contrary to orthodox 
thought. It is fragmented into multiple conversational groups. One can 
participate in any of those as long as one learns the rules of the language games 
within which postmodern public administration operates. 
In addition, one can observe that modernity influences the field of PA through its 
instrumental rationality. Even though positivism, as a modern logic of inquiry 
has shaped the field and is still considered the mainstream in PA research, it has 
some serious limitations that decrease its ability to improve the field. This 
disability is shown clearly through applying the scientific principles in political 
situations where PA usually has in practice. This problem drew a particular 
framework in the field and created a main concept of politics-administration 
dichotomy which categorised the field into two major groups in terms of their 
views to the role of values in research.  
Postmodernism could be the right treatment to solve the problems in PA. 
However, postmodern approach also has its own limitations that make it even 
problematic for PA. Therefore, it sounds that the field needs to keep the canals of 
communication open between all the different contradictory research groups, 
especially modernists and postmodernists. The field needs the contributions and 
experiences of all the different logics of inquiries that aim to improve PA. 
According to Bogason (2001), “Postmodern analysis of public administration is 
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no threat to mainstream research [positivism]. So mainstream researchers should 
stop ignoring it and instead actively discuss the challenges, realizing that the 
agenda is different from the traditional disagreement among researchers.”     
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REVIEW OF AMITAV ACHARYA’S 
WHOSE IDEAS MATTER? AGENCY AND POWER IN ASIAN REGIONALISM 
 
Ryuta Ito1  
Amitav Acharya has produced an innovative assessment of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at an important juncture in the organisation's 
development. He does not shy away from the challenge of measuring ASEAN's 
rhetoric of regional cooperation against its actual achievement. The theoretical 
and empirical exposition that he displays makes this book sure to be a 
cornerstone on the security and political aspects of ASEAN for both scholars and 
decision makers.  
At its inception in 1967, ASEAN's commitment to peaceful and cooperative 
relations among its members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, 
and Thailand) inspired some scepticism because there were continued disputes 
left over from the decolonisation period as well as the fear of communist 
insurgency spreading beyond Indochina. With some encouragement from the 
Western countries, ASEAN managed to survive its first few years. After the 
Vietnam War, its members sought to become something more than pawns in 
Southeast Asian security affairs. Although ASEAN did not succeed to mount 
effective resistance to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, it did 
subsequently contribute to isolate Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge regime 
diplomatically. As the Cold War came to a close ASEAN helped to broker a 
peaceful settlement in Cambodia. It then created the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) to discuss security issues and produced the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) initiative. With self-confidence produced by these initiatives as well as by 
the rising tide of prosperity among its members, ASEAN became a regional 
organisation with comprehensive membership that presumably would allow it to 
rank in importance with the United States, China, or Japan in important regional 
affairs. 
What distinguishes Acharya's analysis of ASEAN's development is his use of the 
constructivist approach to analysing international relations. Avoiding the models 
of actors making rational calculations of utility under conditions of objective and 
external constraint, this approach gives new insight to behaviouralism by giving 
transnational relations an essential importance due to the effect they can have in 
changing norms, perceptions, and identities. Through this process a state, or 
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relations between states, may be peacefully changed or take on a particular 
character. His constructivist approach is helpful in explaining the peculiar nature 
of ASEAN. It commits member governments to the informal discussion of issues 
rather than to formal negotiation processes, to decision making by consensus 
rather than by voting, to non-interference in each other's domestic problems 
rather than obliging common values and practices, to the non-use of force 
between members, and to the avoidance of collective defence measures. Together 
these and other norms constitute what is called the ASEAN Way, which has laid 
the foundation for ASEAN as a security community. Though ASEAN is not a 
formal rule-making and rule-enforcing institution, it has developed common 
aims such as protecting regional stability against disruption by external actors, as 
well as norms and a distinctive sense of corrective "we-ness" among its members. 
The author concludes that ASEAN has taught its members norms that help to 
preserve peace between them. As a result, ASEAN-style regionalism has 
produced a nascent security community. He finds that ASEAN has not been 
particularly successful, however, in reconstructing  loyalties among its members, 
who remain sovereignty-bound actors. In addition, it is worth noting that he is 
not particularly optimistic about its future given the internal strains evident since 
membership expansion and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 as well as the 
external pressures generated by Western human rights lobbies and a more 
assertive China.  
With respect to the theoretical framework of the book there are two minor points 
one could raise. First, there is the invocation of Deutsch's concept of a pluralistic 
security community while discarding his broader theory of transactionalism. That 
is, Acharya notes that ASEAN preceded, did not follow as a result of, intensifying 
transnational interactions and cultural convergence between member societies 
and that there is little popular support for ASEAN within member actors. On the 
question of what then created the ASEAN security community in the absence of 
the conditions outlined by  Deutsch , Acharya  refers to the learning and 
socialisation of  norms that occur within international institutions, which then 
may lead national elites to redefine their notions of interest and identity. Critics 
can suppose that here he could have done more with the elite-led, cognitively 
based neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas. 
The second point has to do with the effort of counter-factual, that is, evaluating 
alternative organisations other than ASEAN. The constructivist approach does 
put the focus on norms, but is this approach in the end better at explaining 
ASEAN as a security community than a realist insight of the diplomatic 
community serving  separate interests of its members in maintaining stability or a 
neoliberal definition of ASEAN as a security regime dedicated to preserving 
cooperation among member actors? 
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It is true that such characterisations tend to exclude the possibility of weakening 
sovereignty or the formation of a collective identity by individual states engaged 
in cooperation, but by his account the sovereignty-bound national identities of 
ASEAN's members remain unchanged over thirty years after ASEAN's inception. 
Despite these problems, Acharya has written a path-breaking work on ASEAN, 
Asian Regionalism, and the security cooperation in Southeast Asia as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
